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FORTY YEARS OF DEATH: THE
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF
THE DEATH PENALTY IN SOUTH
CAROLINA (STILL ARBITRARY
AFTER ALL THESE YEARS)
JOHN H. BLUME* & LINDSEY S. VANN**
INTRODUCTION
We now have forty years of experience under the "death belt" in
South Carolina. The Supreme Court of the United States approved new
death sentencing schemes in 19761 and the death penalty has been in
business more or less full time in the Palmetto State since then.' Last
year, two Justices of the Supreme Court called for full briefing on the
constitutionality of the death penalty in light of forty years of data that
demonstrate the death penalty statutes enacted in the 1970s have not
lived up to constitutional demands.' In this Article, we will report and
comment on the results of four decades of-in Justice Blackmun's
words -"tinker[ing] with the machinery of death"4 in South Carolina.
Copyright © 2016 John H. Blume & Lindsey S. Vann.
* Samuel F. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques, Cornell Law School, and Director, Cornell
Death Penalty Project. The authors would like to thank Amelia Hritz for her invaluable research
and data analysis assistance and Hannah Freedman, David Katz and Laura King for their research
assistance.
** Staff Attorney at Justice 360 (formerly the Death Penalty Resource & Defense Center) in
Columbia, South Carolina and former Cornell Death Penalty Project Fellow.
1. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2. As will be described in more detail in the next section of this Article, in 1974, South
Carolina enacted a mandatory death penalty statute that was deemed unconstitutional in 1976,
but a new statute was almost immediately enacted by the legislature and signed by the Governor.
See infra notes 13, 23-24 and accompanying text.
3. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice
Ginsburg).
4. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial
of certiorari). In 2002, after twenty-five years with the current death penalty statute, one of the
authors published a similar report of the status of South Carolina's death penalty. John H. Blume,
Twenty-Five Years of Death: A Report of the Cornell Death Penalty Project on the "Modern" Era
of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 54 S.C. L. REV. 285 (2002).
184 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 11:1&2
It is not a pretty picture, and our bottom line is that the arbitrariness
that led the Supreme Court to invalidate the death penalty in 1972 is
still very much alive today. We will begin with a brief history of South
Carolina's "modern" death penalty system.
I. THE BEGINNING OF THE MODERN ERA
In Furman v. Georgia, a bare 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court
invalidated all then-existing death penalty statutes. 5 Each of the
Justices in the majority wrote separately, and no clear consensus
emerged as to why the death penalty, which had been upheld against
constitutional attack just the year before,6 was now unconstitutional. At
the risk of oversimplification, the constitutional rub arose from the fact
that the death penalty was imposed in only a fraction of cases in which
it was legally available and the Justices could divine no rational basis
explaining why some offenders were sentenced to death while others
were spared.7 For this reason, the Court found that all state systems of
capital punishment allowed for arbitrary and capricious imposition of
capital punishment.8 Justice Brennan's concurring opinion captures
this sentiment: "When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial
number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is
virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it
smacks of little more than a lottery system."9 There was, in short, no
"rational basis that could differentiate in those terms the few who die
from the many who go to prison."'0 The fear that racial discrimination
5. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
6. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 193 (1971) (rejecting the argument that the
absence of standards to guide jury's discretion in death penalty sentencing was "fundamentally
lawless" and violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
7. In most pre-Furman schemes, including South Carolina's, the jury decided the issue of
the defendant's guilt and the appropriateness of the death penalty in the same unitary proceeding.
See S.C. CODE § 16-52 (Michie 1962), invalidated by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
(current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2010)). If the jury found the defendant guilty of
murder, it would recommend mercy if it thought a life sentence was appropriate and would not
recommend mercy if it favored death. Id.
8. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) ("Because of the uniqueness of the death
penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a
substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.").
9. Furman, 408 U.S. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 294. Justice Stewart echoed Justice Brennan's concerns: "These death sentences
are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual .... I
simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and
freakishly imposed." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White voiced similar objections
to imposing capital punishment, stating, "the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even
for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
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played a significant role in the death selection process was also of grave
concern to several members of the Court." The primary flaw in the
statutes before the Court creating the intolerable arbitrariness was that
jurors had complete and unguided discretion in deciding whether a
capital defendant should receive the death penalty or life in prison. 2
Many states, including South Carolina, rushed to create capital
sentencing schemes that would satisfy the new constitutional
standard. 3 The post-Furman statutes fell into two broad categories:
mandatory death penalty statutes and guided discretion statutes. Both
types of new death penalty laws were intended to reduce the role of
jury discretion. The mandatory statutes did so by eliminating it; if a
defendant was found guilty of a capital offense, then the death penalty
was imposed-no ifs, ands, or buts. The guided discretion statutes
attempted to reduce arbitrariness by creating new procedures. The
central features of most guided discretion schemes included bifurcated
trial (separating the issues of guilt-or-innocence and punishment), the
creation of statutory aggravating circumstances limiting eligibility for
capital punishment, permitting consideration of mitigating
circumstances, and mandatory appellate review (including
proportionality review). By 1976, the new laws made their way back to
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court upheld the guided discretion
statutes, but concluded that the mandatory statutes violated the Eighth
Amendment. ' 4
in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
11. See, e.g., id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (opining it was "incontestable that the death
penalty inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his race,
religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for
the play of such prejudices"). Justice Marshall agreed, stating "It is immediately apparent that
Negroes were executed far more often than whites in proportion to their percentage of the
population." Id. at 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring).
12. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,189 (1976) ("Furman mandates that where discretion
is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life
should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited as to minimize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."). The South Carolina Supreme Court,
following Furman, struck down the South Carolina statute in State v. Gibson, 259 S.C. 459, 462
(1972).
13. See State v. Rogers, 270 S.C. 285, 288, 242 S.E.2d 215, 216 (1978)
14. The Court granted certiorari in five cases. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), involved guided discretion
statutes of various types that were deemed constitutional. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), involved mandatory statutes that were
invalidated. While beyond the scope of this article, the Texas statute was (and is) a "hybrid"
falling somewhere between guided discretion and mandatory in classification and most
commentators assert, and we agree, if the Supreme Court had it to do over again they would have
invalidated the Texas statute in 1976 as well. See, e.g., Jordan Steiker, Penry v. Lynaugh: The
2016]
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Gregg v. Georgia was the lead case. Justice Stewart's opinion stated,
"[d]espite the continuing debate, dating back to the 19th century, over
the morality and utility of capital punishment, it is now evident that a
large proportion of American society continues to regard it as an
appropriate and necessary criminal sanction."15 Thus, the Court
concluded the death penalty was not per se violative of the Eighth
Amendment. The Georgia statute passed constitutional muster even
though "some jury discretion still exists" because "'the discretion to be
exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce
non-discriminatory application.' 1 6 The Court concluded:
In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of
death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be
met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing
authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general
proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides
for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is
apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence
and provided with standards to guide its use of the information.
7
The Court also emphasized the importance of appellate review:
As an important additional safeguard against arbitrariness and
caprice, the Georgia statutory scheme provides for automatic
appeal of all death sentences to the State's Supreme Court. That
court is required by statute to review each sentence of death and
determine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion or
prejudice, whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of a
statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether the sentence is
disproportionate compared to those sentences imposed in similar
cases.
18
The mandatory statutes, on the other hand, did not fare so well. In
Woodson v. North Carolina,19 the Court reasoned that such statutes
were out of step with "contemporary" standards of decency because
Hazards of Predicting the Future, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES (John H. Blume & Jordan M.
Steiker eds., 2010). In 2011, after his retirement from the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens said
that he would change only one vote from his tenure, his vote in Jurek: "I think upon reflection,
we should have held the Texas statute .. . to fit under the mandatory category and be
unconstitutional. In my judgment we made a mistake in that case." EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD
JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 439-40
(2013)
15. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179.
16. Id. at 198 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)).
17. Id. at 195.
18. Id. at 198.
19. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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they eliminated the jury's essential role in maintaining a "link"
between "community values" and the capital punishment system. 20 The
Court also believed that the mandatory statutes only "papered over"
the problem of unguided and unchecked discretion because juries
would refuse to convict many defendants of murder if forced with such
a Draconian choice.2' Due to the uniqueness of the death penalty, the
Court held the Constitution required that the sentencer could not be
precluded from considering the "character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense. "22
Since South Carolina had initially bet on the wrong constitutional
horse by enacting a mandatory capital punishment scheme,23 the South
Carolina Supreme Court was forced to find the mandatory statute
invalid.24 In 1977, the General Assembly passed the current death
penalty statue,25 which closely modeled the Georgia law approved by
the High Court in Greg.26
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the new statute in State
v. Shaw.27 The court concluded that the "statutory death penalty
complex adopted by the General Assembly ...is constitutionally
indistinguishable from the statutory complex approved by the United
States Supreme Court in Gregg. '21 In the state court's opinion, the new
procedures "focus the sentencing authorities' attention on the
particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics
of the individual defendant. ' 29 This guidance sufficiently reduced the
likelihood of the death penalty being imposed capriciously.3 ° The court
also noted that the statutorily mandated appellate review, including the
20. Id. at 295.
21. Id. at 302.
22. Id. at 304.
23. See S.C. CODE § 16-52 (Michie 1962), invalidated by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (current version at S.C. CODE § 16-3-20 (2010)).
24. State v. Rumsey, 267 S.C. 236, 239, 226 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1976) ("As our statute does not
permit the exercise of controlled discretion in imposing the death penalty required by the recent
decision... it too is constitutionally defective.").
25. See 1977 Act No. 177 § 1 (effective June 8, 1977).
26. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-68 (describing Georgia's death penalty sentencing scheme).
There have been no substantial changes to the South Carolina death penalty statute in the last
forty years; however, the number of statutory aggravating circumstances has grown significantly,
see infra text accompanying notes 173-74, and a capital defendant's parole eligibility (if the
sentencer chooses the life option) has been extended from twenty years to thirty years and then
eliminated. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2010).
27. 273 S.C. 194, 205, 255 S.E.2d 799, 804 (1979).
28. Id. at 203, 255 S.E.2d at 803-04.
29. Id., 255 S.E.2d at 804.
30. Id.
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requirement that the court determine whether the death sentence was
disproportionate or excessive, served "Las] an additional check against
the random imposition of the death penalty."'"
II. POST-FURMAN AND GREGG DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS
In the forty years since it approved the new death penalty schemes,
the Supreme Court has enacted new limitations on the death penalty
in an attempt to ensure the states impose death sentences in a manner
consistent with the constitutional demands set out in Furman and
Gregg. A theme in Furman and Gregg, reaffirmed repeatedly over the
last forty years, is that capital punishment should be reserved for the
most culpable offenders who commit the most heinous crimes. Justice
Kennedy recently stated "the death penalty is reserved for a narrow
category of crimes and offenders"3 2 -for the "worst of the worst."33
This "worst of the worst" principle influenced the Court in Gregg to
conclude that the death penalty was not disproportionate in all cases
because while "Li]t is an extreme sanction, [it is] suitable to the most
extreme of crimes. '"" Since Gregg, the Court has made clear that capital
punishment should be "reserved for those crimes that are 'so grievous
an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penalty of death."'35
The commitment to reserve capital punishment for the "worst of
the worst" and conversely to prevent "average murderers" from being
sentenced to death manifests itself in two discrete areas of the Court's
capital punishment jurisprudence. First, the Court "has consistently
confined the imposition of the death penalty to a narrow category of
the most serious crimes."36 Thus the death penalty may not be imposed
31. Id. at 211, 255 S.E. 2d at 807.
32. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
33. In Furman, Justice Brennan found that the low levels of infliction of capital punishment
made it "highly implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst
crimes are selected for this punishment." 408 U.S. 238, 293-94 (Brennan, J., concurring). In fact,
he noted that if "Furman or his crime illustrates the 'extreme,' then nearly all murderers and their
murders are also 'extreme."' Id. at 294.
34. 428 U.S. at 187. The Court further found the death penalty served the penological goal,
or social purpose, of retribution when imposed for the worst crimes:
Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is
an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront
to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.
Id. at 184.
35. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184, 187).
36. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
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for non-homicide offenses.37 Even for those found guilty of murder, the
requirement that a state prove an aggravating circumstance before a
defendant is eligible to be sentenced to death is intended to provide the
required narrowing and reserve the sentence for only the worst or most
extreme murders. Thus states are required to "give narrow and precise
definition to the aggravating factors that can result in a capital
sentence."38 Furthermore, it is not enough that an aggravating
circumstance "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty," it must also "reasonably justify the imposition of a more
severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder."3 Where the state fails to narrowly and precisely define an
aggravating circumstance, it "fail[s] adequately to channel the
sentencing decision" as required by Gregg.4" As a result, the Court has
invalidated aggravating circumstances broadly defined to allow the
imposition of the death penalty upon a defendant whose "crimes
cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness materially more
'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder."'"
The Court has also prohibited the imposition of the death penalty
on those deemed less culpable than the worst offender, holding that its
"narrowing jurisprudence . . . seeks to ensure that only the most
deserving of execution are put to death.14 2 In order to do so, the Court
requires that "[i]n any capital case a defendant has wide latitude to
raise as a mitigating factor 'any aspect of [his or her] character or record
... as a basis for a sentence less than death." 43 The Court has also barred
the imposition of the death penalty on certain individuals deemed
categorically undeserving of the death penalty. In Enmund v. Florida44
and Tison v. Arizona,45 for example, the Court held that persons guilty
37. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 437 (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for the rape
of a child); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty for felony murder where the defendant did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for the
rape of an adult woman).
38. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
39. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
40. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 433 (1980).
41. Id. at 433. In Godfrey, the Court considered the Georgia aggravating circumstance that
made a murder found to be "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" death eligible.
The Court found "[a] person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder
as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman."' Id. at 428-29.
42. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
43. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
44. 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
45. 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987).
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of murder as an accessory but who did not actually kill could only be
sentenced to death if they were major participants in the criminal
offense and showed deliberate indifference to human life. Then, in
Atkins v. Virginia, the Court created a categorical bar to execution for
persons with intellectual disability (formerly classified as mental
retardation), finding, "[i]f the culpability of the average murderer is
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State,
the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not
merit that form of retribution."46 Several years later, the Court similarly
found that juvenile offenders "cannot with reliability be classified
among the worst offenders" and barred the execution of offenders who
committed a crime before turning eighteen in Roper v. Simmons.47
In a similar vein, the Court has attempted to eliminate other forms
of arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty, particularly
arbitrariness resulting from racial discrimination. Multiple justices in
Furman based their decision, at least in part, on the fact that the death
penalty was disproportionately imposed on African Americans.48 Since
then, the Court has "engaged in 'unceasing efforts' to eradicate racial
prejudice" in the administration of capital punishment and the criminal
justice system as a whole.49 For example, the Court has prohibited the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty on the
basis of race,5" prohibited racially biased prosecutorial arguments,5 '
prohibited prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges to
potential jurors on the basis of race,52 and allowed defendants in capital
cases to ask potential jurors about any racial biases they might harbor. 3
The attempts of the Court to make the death penalty's
administration more reliable and less arbitrary have been largely
unsuccessful. These failures have led former and current members of
the Court who once supported capital punishment to question whether
its attempts to regulate death were worth the candle. Justice Lewis
46. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
47. 543 U.S. at 569.
48. See supra note 11.
49. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987).
50. Id. at 309 n.30 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
51. Id. (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
52. Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
53. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986). Recognizing that the modern statutes
continue to leave death sentences to the jury, the Court found capital sentencing proceedings are
particularly susceptible to racial discrimination: "Because of the range of discretion entrusted to
a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate
but remain undetected." Id. at 35.
THE DEATH PENALTY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
Powell, for example, said after his retirement that if he could change
one vote during his 15-year career as a Supreme Court Justice it would
be his decision to uphold the Georgia death penalty in the face of
strong evidence of racial discrimination. 4 Justice Powell later
expressed that he had "come to think that capital punishment should
be abolished" and it "serves no useful purpose. '55 Justice Harry
Blackmun concluded late in his career that the Court's efforts to curb
capital punishment's flaws had been an abject failure and, as noted
previously in this article, stated he would no longer "tinker with the
machinery of death. '56 Justice John Paul Stevens has made clear that
he finds the death penalty is an irreparably flawed government
program.57 And most recently, Justice Stephen Breyer, called for full
briefing on the constitutionality of the death penalty as a whole.58 In his
dissenting opinion in a recent case involving lethal injection protocols,
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, stated:
In 1976, the Court thought that the constitutional infirmities in the
death penalty could be healed; the Court in effect delegated
significant responsibility to the States to develop procedures that
would protect against those constitutional problems. Almost 40
years of studies, surveys, and experience strongly indicate, however,
that this effort has failed. Today's administration of the death
penalty involves three fundamental constitutional defects: (1)
serious unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in application, and (3)
unconscionably long delays that undermine the death penalty's
penological purpose. Perhaps as a result, (4) most places within the
United States have abandoned its use. 59
According to Justice Breyer, the first three considerations-
unreliability, arbitrariness, and delays -make the punishment cruel; the
abandonment of the practice makes it unusual.6 ° Justice Breyer found
that these unresolved and unresolvable issues make it "highly likely
that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment" and tasked
54. John Jeffries, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL: A BIOGRAPHY 451-53 (2001) (reporting that
Justice Powell said in 1991 that he would change his vote in McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279).
55. MANDERY, supra note 14, at 438.
56. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
57. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 71 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that though it
did not "justify a refusal to respect precedents," based on his own experience, "the imposition of
the death penalty represents 'the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes').
58. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2755-56.
60. Id. at 2756-73.
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litigators to raise these issues with the Court.6 Given Justice Breyer's
directive, the next section of this Article assesses South Carolina's
death penalty in light of his constitutional concerns.
III. THE SOUTH CAROLINA DEATH PENALTY BY THE NUMBERS
A. An Overview of Forty Years of Death Sentences and Executions
Before directly addressing Justice Breyer's reasons questioning the
constitutional legitimacy of capital punishment, we will "set the table"
by providing an overview of what forty years of death in South Carolina
has "produced." As of December 31, 2015, forty-four men, and no
women, wait to die on South Carolina's death row.62 Despite the fact
that African Americans comprise only 28% of the state's population,63
twenty-six of the death row inmates (59%) are black.64 One death row
inmate is Hispanic (2%) and seventeen are white (39 %).65 Seventeen
of the twenty-six African American inmates (65%), the Hispanic
inmate (100%), and fifteen of the seventeen white inmates (88%) were
convicted of murdering one or more white victims. 66 The men currently
on death row have been there for an average of 14.5 years, and no
executions are expected for at least the next several years. As of the
publication date of this Article, nine of the individuals currently on
death row have been granted relief, either in the form of a complete
retrial or a new sentencing hearing, and are currently awaiting that new
proceeding or the grant of relief has been appealed by the State.67
In the "modern era" of capital punishment, 180 men and 1 woman
have been sentenced to death.68 Ninety-three (51%) of the 181 people
61. Id. at 2776-77. Justice Breyer's call to arms is not unprecedented. In 1963, Justice Arthur
Goldberg filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375
U.S. 889 (1963), stating he thought the Court should consider whether the death penalty for the
crime of rape violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Goldberg's dissent fueled the
litigation that resulted in Furman.
62. Appendix B to this Article lists the forty-four inmates on South Carolina's death row as
of December 31, 2015.
63. Calculated using population as of 2010. South Carolina Population by Race and Hispanic
Origin (1980-2010), SOUTH CAROLINA REVENUE AND FISCAL AFFAIRS OFFICE,
http://abstract.sc.gov/chapterl4/popl2.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
64. See infra Appendix B.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See infra Appendix B. For more on the errors found in these and other cases, see infra
Section IV.B.
68. Appendix A to this Article lists all individuals sentenced to death in South Carolina
from 1977 through 2015 with information about their race, the victim(s)'s race, and the county of
conviction. Though this Article analyzes the forty years of South Carolina's post-Furman modern
THE DEATH PENALTY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
to receive a death sentence were white, eighty-six (48%) were African
American, one (.55%) was Hispanic, and one (.55%) was Native
American.69 Our statistical calculations based on the total number of
death sentences use 187 death sentences because we have counted six
of the 181 individuals as receiving two death sentences, either for
murders committed in two different counties or individual sentences
for multiple victims within the same county.70
There have been forty-three executions in South Carolina since
1976,71 the most recent of which occurred on May 6, 2011 when Jeffrey
Motts waived his future appeals and was executed by lethal injection.72
Only eight states have executed more death-sentenced inmates. 73 All
those executed were men; twenty-six (60%) were white, sixteen (37%)
were black, and one (2%) was Native American.74 Ten of the executions
were carried out on "volunteers" who, like Motts, waived their available
appeals in order to be executed.75
death penalty, the sentencing data do not include death sentences under the 1974 death penalty
statute, which was ultimately deemed unconstitutional and would skew the statistics drawn from
the sentencing data.
69. See infra Appendix A.
70. See id. (indicating Ronald Woomer, Larry Gene Bell, Richard Longworth, James
Tucker, Thomas Ivey, and Stephen Stanko received two death sentences each). In practice, most
defendants convicted of murdering multiple victims receive a death sentence for each victim;
however, it is not always readily apparent whether a defendant received a death sentence for each
murder victim. Therefore, the authors have only counted multiple death sentences only where
court records explicitly indicate the defendant received multiple death sentences.
71. Appendix C to this Article lists those individuals executed in South Carolina since the
state reinstated the death penalty in 1974. The last execution in South Carolina prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Furman was in 1962. From 1912 to 1962, South Carolina executed
241 persons. Bruce L. Pearson, Why the Death Penalty is at Issue, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
SOUTH CAROLINA: OUTLOOK FOR THE 1980S 9 (Bruce L. Pearson ed., 1981).
72. See infra Appendix C. As South Carolina law currently stands, the condemned inmate
is allowed to choose the method of execution, either lethal injection or electrocution. See S.C.
Code § 24-3-530. If the inmate does not make an election, the execution method will default to
lethal injection if he was sentenced after 1995 or to electrocution if he was sentenced before 1995.
Id. § 24-3-530(B), (C).
73. Those states are Texas (524), Oklahoma (112), Virginia (110), Florida (90), Missouri
(83), Alabama (56), Georgia (57), and Ohio (53). Number of Executions by State and Region Since
1976, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-
executions-state-and-region-1976 (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). North Carolina has executed the
same number of death-sentenced inmates as South Carolina in the modern era. Id.
74. See infra Appendix D.
75. See infra Appendix D. Eight of the ten volunteers were white males. See id. For a more
detailed discussion of "volunteers," see John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide
and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939 (2005).
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B. Cruel-Lack of Reliability
Justice Breyer found a lack of reliability evidenced by
exonerations, studies showing convincing evidence that innocent
people have been executed, and in the overall error rates in capital
cases.76 Error plagues the administration of the death penalty in South
Carolina. Most people sentenced to death in South Carolina are
ultimately removed from death row for reasons other than their
execution.
Pending
(Relief
Granted)
Court Reversal
Resulting in
Less than
Death
Sentence
47%
Died on Death Row 5%
Figure 1: Outcome of death sentences
Eighty-four men and one woman who were sentenced to death are
no longer on death row because their conviction and/or sentence were
subsequently overturned during the capital appeals process.77 Three
76. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756-59 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. See infra Appendix A.
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were acquitted at retrials." Eighty-two were sentenced to life
imprisonment or a term of years after a new trial or a plea bargain. 9
Thus, approximately 47% of those individuals who were sentenced to
death in the modern era of capital punishment were subsequently
determined to be either not guilty, guilty of a lesser offense, or
deserving of a sentence less than death. By contrast, only 24% of those
sentenced to death have been executed.
During the modern era of the death penalty, three South Carolina
men sentenced to death had their convictions overturned and were
subsequently acquitted of murder charges at their retrials°-Michael
Linder," Jessie Keith Brown,12 and Warren D. Manning. 3 Joseph Ard
was also released from prison after a jury found he did not intentionally
kill his girlfriend and their unborn child, and thus, was guilty only of
manslaughter. 4 Another former death row inmate, Edward Lee
Elmore, was released after strong evidence of his innocence emerged
resulting in his conviction being vacated. 5 Other former death row
inmates who have subsequently been released from prison, e.g. Sterling
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Linder was convicted and sentenced to death in 1979 for the killing of a police officer.
After his conviction was overturned, new ballistics evidence confirmed Linder's self-defense
theory and he was acquitted. State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981); DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, INNOCENCE CASES, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
innocence-cases (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
82. After his convictions for armed robbery and murder were twice overturned, evidence
was presented that Brown's half-brother actually committed the murder and the jury acquitted
Brown of murder charges. State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 347 S.E.2d 882 (1986); State v. Brown,
296 S.C. 191, 371 S.E.2d 523 (1988); 'Devastated' by Verdict, Victim's Family Rips Jury,
SPARTANBURG HERALD J. Jan. 16, 1989, at Al, available at
http://www.goupstate.com/article/19890116/NEWS/901160312.
83. On the state's fifth attempt to obtain a conviction against Manning (Manning's
conviction was overturned twice and two mistrials were declared before the state prosecuted
Manning for a fifth time), the jury acquitted Manning of the 1989 slaying of a police officer. State
v. Manning, 329 S.C. 1, 495 S.E.2d 191 (1997); State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 409 S.E.2d 372
(1991); DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, INNOCENCE CASES, http://www.deathpenalt
yinfo.org/innocence -cases.
84. John Monk, Inmate Goes from Death Row to Freedom, POST & COURIER, Jul. 31, 2012,
available at http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20120731/PC16/120739886/1005/inmate-goes-
from-death-row-to-freedom; see also Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 336, 642 S.E.2d 590, 599 (2007).
85. Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 2011); see also RAYMOND BONNER, ANATOMY
OF INJUSTICE: A MURDER CASE GONE WRONG (2012).
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Spann 6 and Ernest Riddle,87 had their sentences reduced due to their
likely innocence.
Unreliability also occurs when individuals are erroneously
sentenced to death, i.e. when the "courts failed to follow legally
required procedures" in capital cases.88 Over the last forty years, error
has been found in more than sixty percent of all South Carolina death
penalty trials in the course of the appellate and post-conviction review
process mandated by the South Carolina death penalty scheme,
including: (1) direct appeal, 9  (2) state post-conviction relief
proceedings, 9° (3) federal habeas corpus, 9' and, (4) state habeas
corpus. 92 For the purposes of this Article, "error" is defined as "an
error occurring at trial serious enough to warrant a new trial either as
to the defendant's guilt or as to the appropriate punishment." We have
not counted cases in which a reviewing court found trial error but
nevertheless concluded that the error was harmless. 93
The South Carolina Supreme Court has reviewed 227 death
judgments 94 in connection with the first mandatory, or "direct," appeal
and has granted new trials or resentencing proceedings in eighty-one
cases, for an error rate of 36%. 9' The Supreme Court of the United
86. After seventeen years on death row, Spann accepted an Alford plea when his conviction
was overturned based on newly discovered evidence of innocence. He was paroled in 2006. See
State v. Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 513 S.E.2d 98 (1999); Keith Morrison, A 20-Year Quest for Freedom,
NBC NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19161103/ns/dateline-nbc-crime-reports/t/-year-quest-
freedom/#.VrojglgrKHs.
87. After twenty-one years on death row, Riddle pled no contest after his conviction was
overturned based on the fact that the State failed to turn over evidence calling into question the
credibility of the main witness against Riddle. Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 28,631 S.E.2d 70 (2006);
Tim Gulla, Ernest Riddle of Death Row, GAFFNEY LEDGER, Sept. 19, 2011, at 1, available at
http://www.gaffneyledger.com/news/2011-09-19/Front-Page/ErnestRiddle off death row.html.
Riddle was sentenced to thirty years in prison and was released in 2015.
88. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct 2726, 2758-59 (2015).
89. S.C. Code § 16-2-25(A) ("Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the
judgment becoming final in the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina.").
90. S.C. Code § 17-27-160 (setting forth the procedures for post-conviction review in capital
cases).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (providing for federal court review of state criminal convictions).
92. Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 467-68, 397 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1990).
93. See, e.g., State v. Stanko, 402 S.C. 252, 265, 741 S.E.2d 708,715 (2013) (finding improper
jury instruction harmless); State v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 105, 123, 326 S.E.2d 132, 143 (1985) (finding
improper malice jury instruction was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt).
94. The number of cases reviewed is greater than the total number of individuals sentenced
to death because some individuals were again sentenced to death after their original sentence was
overturned, requiring the appellate review process to begin anew. Two death sentences have not
yet been reviewed on direct appeal. Appendix E to this Article lists all cases reviewed on direct
appeal by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
95. See infra Appendix E. In forty-one cases, the court granted an entire new trial. In thirty-
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States found error in nine cases affirmed by the state supreme court, 6
for an overall error rate on direct appeal of 39%.97
The types of error detected in the direct appeal cases can be
broadly categorized. 98 The three largest categories of error are
instructional error, prosecutorial misconduct, and evidentiary error.99
In twenty-nine cases (13% of all cases decided on direct appeal),
prosecutorial misconduct was a reason, if not the sole reason, for
reversal. 00 In forty-five cases (21%), there was prejudicial error in the
nine cases, the court ordered a new sentencing trial. In one case, the court vacated the death
sentence because the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the crime, resulting in an
unconstitutional death sentence under Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). The direct appeal
affirmance rate in capital cases in South Carolina increased significantly after the 1994 election of
Attorney General Charles Condon, due in part to his making death penalty appeals a political
issue. Part of Condon's campaign involved criticizing the South Carolina Supreme Court for its
record in capital cases. See John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty
Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 474-75 (1999). Between
1977 and 1994, the affirmance rate on direct appeal was only 50%. Between 1994 and 2014, the
affirmance rate increased to 78o%. See infra Appendix E. The national error rate on direct appeal
as found by a study of all death sentences between 1973 and 1995 was 410%. James S. Liebman, et
al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1839, 1847 (2000).
A more recent study determined that approximately 38% of all death sentences between 1973
and 2003, nationally, have been overturned at some point during the appellate process. Frank R.
Baumgartner & Anna W. Dietrich, Most Death Penalty Sentences are Overturned. Here's Why
That Matters, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ monkey-
cage/wp/2015/03/17/most-death-penaty-sentences- are -overturned-heres-why-that-matters/.
96. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006); Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S.
246 (2002); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154
(1994); Patterson v. South Carolina, 493 U.S. 1013 (1990) (order); Jones v. South Carolina, 476
U.S. 1102 (1986) (order); Plemmons v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1102 (order); Elmore v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1101 (1986) (order); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
97. The error rate would likely be substantially higher if the South Carolina Supreme Court
had not jettisoned in favorem vitae (in favor of life) review. For two hundred years, errors could
be raised on direct appeal in capital cases even if there was no objection at trial. However, in State
v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 60-69, 406 S.E.2d 315, 324-28 (1991) (plurality opinion) (Toal, J.,
concurring), the court determined that the in favorem vitae rule was outdated and, despite the
absence of evidence to support the assertion, it encouraged "sandbagging" by defense counsel.
The reversal rate on direct appeal prior to Torrence was 51% (in fifty of ninety-nine cases, the
state supreme court granted either an entire new trial or a new sentencing trial). After Torrence,
the reversal rate fell to 24% (error was found in 31 of 127 cases). See infra Appendix E.
98. Appendix F to this Article sets forth the errors found by category.
99. Some cases had more than one error, and error of more than one type.
100. Most of these cases involved improper prosecutorial argument. See, e.g., State v.
Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 222-23, 641 S.E.2d 873, 881-82 (2007) (reversing based on the
prosecution's improper statements during closing argument that he "expects" a death sentence
and failure to return a death sentence would declare an "open season on babies in Lexington
County"); State v. Cockerham, 294 S.C. 380, 381, 365, S.E.2d 22, 22-23 (1998) (reversing based
on the prosecution's improper reference to the defendant's refusal to testify). However, other
types of misconduct occurred as well. See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 354 S.C. 390, 396, 581 S.E.2d 157,
161 (2003) (reversing based on improper law enforcement contact with qualified juror family
members).
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trial court's instructions to the jury.'0' In forty-two cases (19%), there
was evidentiary error, which for the purposes of this Article, refers to
situations where the trial judge either admitted improper prejudicial
evidence or excluded relevant admissible evidence. 0 2 Most, but not all,
detected errors fit into these categories. 03 It is also important to note a
type of error that has never been found. The South Carolina Supreme
Court has never determined that any death sentence was
disproportionate to the offense.0 4
Error was found in an additional fifty cases in the post-direct
appeal capital collateral appeals process. 05 Overall, when factoring in
state post-conviction appeals, motions for new trial due to newly
discovered evidence, federal habeas corpus, and state habeas corpus
140 of the 233 death sentences imposed in South Carolina have been
101. See, e.g., State v. Cottrell, 376 S.C. 260, 265, 657 S.E.2d 451, 453-54 (2008) (reversing
based on failure to give voluntary manslaughter instruction). Other cases involved the trial court
giving the jury a legally incorrect instruction. See, e.g., State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 417, 409
S.E.2d 372, 374-75 (1991) (reversing based on incorrect reasonable doubt instruction).
102. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 383 S.C. 535, 550, 681 S.E.2d 580, 588 (2009) (reversing because
the trial court improperly admitted barefoot insole impression evidence); State v. Burkhart, 371
S.C. 482, 488, 640 S.E.2d 450, 453 (2007) (reversing based on admission of improper prison
condition evidence).
103. See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 407 S.C. 27, 37, 753 S.E.2d 545, 550 (2014) (reversing based on
the trialjudge's use of an improper standard in determining whether the defendant was competent
to waive his right to counsel); State v. Rivera, 402 S.C. 225, 249, 741 S.E.2d 694, 707 (2013)
(reversing based on a violation of the defendant's right to testify at trial); State v. Crisp, 362 S.C.
412, 417, 608 S.E.2d 429, 432 (2005) (reversing based on improper comments made by the trial
judge during a guilty plea).
104. See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
105. Appendix G to this Article lists the forty-two post-conviction relief cases where error
was found in the South Carolina courts. In four other cases the Supreme Court of the United
States found prejudicial error following the state court's post-conviction review. See Yates v.
Aiken, 500 U.S. 391, 393 (1991); Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527, 527 (1987) (per curiam); Koon
v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 943, 943 (1987) (order); Patterson v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 943, 943 (1987) (order).
In one case a motion for new trial was granted due to newly discovered evidence of actual
innocence. See State v. Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 621-22, 513 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1999). In State v. South,
310 S.C. 504, 509, 427 S.E.2d 666, 670 (1993), the trial judge granted a new sentencing trial based
on newly discovered evidence that the defendant had a brain tumor at the time of the offense. On
appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the judge applied the wrong standard
and remanded the case for reconsideration. Id. Before the court could act on the case, South
waived his appeals and was voluntarily executed. See infra Appendix D. In another case, a new
trial was ordered in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 1405, 1410 (4th
Cir. 1987). In two cases, the South Carolina Supreme Court granted a new trial after a petition
for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the court's original jurisdiction. Tucker v. Catoe, 346 S.C.
483,485, 552 S.E.2d 712,713 (2001); Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466,467-68, 397 S.E.2d 87,88 (1990).
In two other cases, error was found in post-conviction proceedings, but the cases remain pending
on appeal and have not been included in our reversal count. We also excluded one case in which
a death-sentenced inmate was found incompetent to be executed. See Singleton v. State, 313 S.C.
75, 84, 437 S.E.2d 53, 58 (1993).
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reversed-an overall reversal rate of 60%.1°6 The error rate would
certainly be higher if South Carolina capital cases were not reviewed
in federal habeas corpus proceedings by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. °7 The Fourth Circuit has historically
been the stingiest federal court of appeals when it comes to granting
relief in capital cases. °8 Capital habeas petitioners within the Fourth
Circuit have prevailed in only 6.2% of cases.0 9 The overall success rate
in other federal circuits over the same time period was 40%." ° Only
one South Carolina capital federal habeas petitioner has ever obtained
relief in the Fourth Circuit, and that was in 1987."'
The most common type of error detected in post-conviction
proceedings, not surprisingly, is the denial of the right to effective
assistance of counsel.12  Twenty-six of the fifty post-conviction
reversals were due to various failings by counsel." 3 Post-conviction
relief has also been granted due to prosecutorial misconduct," 4
instructional error,"5 evidentiary error," 6 newly discovered evidence of
106. Of the 187 original death sentences, 119 have resulted in at least one reversal prior to
either the individual's execution or a subsequent sentence of less than death-an error rate of
65%. Nationally, error is found in 68% of all capital cases. Liebman, supra note 96, at 1850.
107. The Fourth Circuit is the federal court of appeals for South Carolina as well as North
Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia.
108. John H. Blume, The Dance of Death or (Almost) "No One Here Gets Out Alive": The
Fourth Circuit's Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REV. 465, 470-71 (2010).
109. Id. at 469 n.27.
110. Id. at 469 (citing James S. Lehman et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So
Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It 9 (2002),
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf.
111. See Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1987). In 2011, the Fourth Circuit granted
habeas relief in the case of former South Carolina death row inmate Edward Lee Elmore, whose
death sentence had previously been vacated based on a finding he is intellectually disabled.
Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 786, 872 (4th Cir. 2011). The Fourth Circuit found Elmore
received ineffective assistance of counsel and reversed his conviction. Id. at 872. Elmore has since
been released from prison. See infra Appendix A. For more information about Elmore's case,
conviction, and the errors that occurred in his case, see BONNER, supra note 85.
112. See infra Appendix F.
113. See, e.g., Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. 447, 698 S.E.2d 561 (2010) (reversing based on a
finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper remarks during the
solicitor's sentencing phase closing argument); Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 642 S.E.2d 590 (2007)
(reversing based on a finding that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and challenge
gunshot residue evidence). The most common failing of counsel is the failure to adequately
develop and present evidence in mitigation at the sentencing phase of trial. See, e.g., Weik v. State,
409 S.C. 214,761 S.E.2d 757 (2014); Rosemond v. Catoe, 383 S.C. 320,680 S.E.2d 5 (2009); Council
v. State, 380 S.C. 159, 690 S.E.2d 356 (2009).
114. See, e.g., Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 631 S.E.2d 70 (2006) (reversing based on the
prosecution's failure to disclose impeachment evidence and failure to correct false testimony).
115. See, e.g., Yates v. Evat, 500 U.S. 391,393 (1991) (reversing because of improper burden-
shifting instruction regarding implied malice).
116. See, e.g., Chaffee v. State, 294 S.C. 88, 91, 362 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1987) (reversing because
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actual innocence,' 7  and a death sentenced inmate's mental
incompetency to be executed."8 Additionally, though not considered
error at the time of trial, many individuals have been removed from
South Carolina's death row because the Supreme Court later found
they were categorically ineligible for the death penalty as a result of
their age or intellectual capacity. Eight inmates were removed from
South Carolina's death row as a result of the Supreme Court decisions
categorically barring the execution of juveniles" 9 and the intellectually
disabled 20 four as a result of each case.
Finally, while executive clemency is not technically part of the
judicial capital appeals process, it has traditionally been deemed to be
an important failsafe in any capital punishment scheme.' 2' No South
Carolina death row inmate has been granted clemency since the new
death penalty statute has been in effect.122 This was not true prior to
the judge did not allow evidence of adaptability to confinement).
117. State v. Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 621-22, 513 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1999) (reversing based on the
trial judge's rejection of exculpatory expert testimony at a new trial hearing).
118. Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 75, 84, 437 S.E.2d 53, 58 (1993) (finding incompetency based
on the inmate's complete inability to communicate).
119. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Eric Dale Morgan, Ted Power, Herman Hughes,
and Robert Conyers' sentences were vacated pursuant to Roper. See State v. Morgan, 367 S.C.
615, 626 S.E.2d 888 (2006); infra Appendix G. Prior to Roper v. Simmons in 2005, barring the
execution of juveniles under the age of eighteen, South Carolina executed James Terry Roach in
1986 who was seventeen at the time of his crime. See infra Appendix G.; see also INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Resolution No. 3/87, Case 9647 (1987),
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/86.87eng/EUU9647.htm.
120. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. Ricky George, Elis Franklin, Edward Lee Elmore, and Tommy
Lee Davis' sentences were vacated pursuant to Atkins. See infra Appendix G. Kenneth Simmons's
sentence was also vacated pursuant to Atkins; the state appealed. See Simmons v. State, No. 05-
CP-18-1368 (S.C. 1st Cir. C.P. Oct. 21,2013). Simmons also appealed the court's denial of a DNA-
based false evidence claim. The South Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari on the Atkins
claim, but is currently considering whether Simmons's DNA claim warrants a new trial to
determine his guilt or innocence. See Order, Simmons v. State, No. 2014.000387 (S.C. July 27,
2015). In addition, two post-conviction relief courts have granted relief based on a finding that
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence of intellectual disability.
See Evins v. State, No. 07-CP-42-2849 (S.C. 7th Cir. C.P. June 27, 2014); Mercer v. State, No. 09-
CP-32-5465 (S.C. Ilth Cir. C.P. June 27, 2011). One has been resentenced to life without parole
(Evins) and one is pending on resentencing (Mercer). Prior to Atkins, South Carolina executed
at least two intellectually disabled persons-it was undisputed that both Sylvester Adams and
Frank Middleton were intellectually disabled. There was also very strong evidence that Larry
Gilbert was intellectually disabled.
121. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (stating "[e]xecutive clemency has provided
the 'fail safe"' in the capital punishment system) (citations omitted); see also Michael Heise,
Mercy By the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239
(2003) (exploring and criticizing interaction between executive clemency and capital
punishment).
122. Not all of the forty-three inmates who have been executed have requested clemency. In
addition to the ten "volunteers," at least three other inmates (Donald H. Gaskins, Ronnie
Howard, and Anthony Green) elected not to ask the governor for a commutation.
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Furman: we have identified at least twenty-seven death-sentenced
individuals whose sentences were commuted through gubernatorial
clemency in the forty years prior to Furman.123 No other state has
executed so many inmates in the modern era without a single
commutation. 12
4
C. Cruel-Arbitrariness
Forty years ago, the Supreme Court upheld new death penalty
statutes only after finding they would prohibit the death penalty from
being "inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. '"125 Justice
Breyer found that "40 years of further experience make it increasingly
clear that the death penalty is imposed arbitrarily, i.e., without the
,reasonable consistency' legally necessary to reconcile its use with the
Constitution's commands.' 1 26 Arbitrariness, according to Justice
Breyer, is demonstrated by the fact that "the factors that most clearly
ought to affect application of the death penalty -namely, comparative
egregiousness of the crime-often do not."' 12 Instead, "circumstances
that ought not to affect application of the death penalty, such as race,
gender, or geography, often do."'1 28 Our research demonstrates the
same is true in South Carolina -factors such as race, gender, and
geography are greater determining factors in who receives the State's
ultimate penalty than factors such as the egregiousness of the crime.
1. Race and Gender Effects
Of South Carolina's 187 death sentences in the modern era, 151
(81%) were imposed for the killing of a white victim. 29 33 (18%) were
imposed for the killing of an African American victim. 3 ° Three (1%)
death sentences were imposed for the killing of an Asian victim.'
123. A list of the twenty-seven pre-Furman commutations is on file with the authors and was
compiled by searching records maintained at the South Carolina Department of Archives &
History.
124. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, CLEMENCY, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/clemency; see also supra note 73 (listing the states that have carried out the highest
number of executions).
125. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,188 (1976).
126. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct 2726, 2760 (2015) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 112 (1982)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. One hundred fifty-one of the 187 death sentences were imposed for the killing of one or
more white victims; some were also charged with killing minority victims. See infra Appendix A.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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Defendants sentenced to death for killing Asian
victims 1%-
Figure 2: Death sentences by victim race
Sixty-three (34%) of the sentences were imposed on an African
American defendant convicted of killing a white victim.'32 This is so
despite the fact that it is far less common for a homicide to occur with
a white victim/black defendant combination.'33 Death sentencing rates
show the disparity cannot be explained by the demographics of murder
victims. For a black male'34 defendant convicted of killing a white
victim, the death sentencing rate is 8.56 per 100 murders as opposed to
only 0.46 for black victims. 13 5 White males are also sentenced to death
132. Id.
133. John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Explaining Death Row's
Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 192 (2004).
134. Only male defendants were considered in calculating the following sentencing rates
because only one female defendant was sentenced to death after Furman.
135. Death sentencing rates were calculated by comparing the number of arrests for murder
with the number of death sentences imposed, based on the demographics of the defendants and
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at a higher rate for the killing of white victims (5.26 death sentences
per 100 murders) compared to black victims (3.17 death sentences per
100 murders). 36
White
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Native
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Figure 3: Death sentences by race of defendant and victim
the victims. Murder arrest data was obtained using the Supplementary Homicide Reports
compiled by the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data. Fox, James A., and Marc L. Swatt.
Uniform Crime Reports [United States]: Supplementary Homicide Reports With Multiple
Imputation, Cumulative Files 1976-2007. ICPSR24801-vl. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2009-02-24, available at
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR24801.vl. Sentencing data can be found in Appendix A.
136. See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A.
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The gender of the victim also has a noticeable effect on the ultimate
outcome of a murder case in South Carolina. Ninety-eight (53%) of all
death sentences were imposed for the killing of a female victim; the
lone female defendant received a death sentence for killing a male
victim.'37 Though only 22% of all South Carolina murders involved a
female victim,'38 53% of the death sentences imposed, and 58% of the
executions carried out, were female victim cases.'39 Death sentencing
rates are higher when the victim is female regardless of the defendant's
race. White male defendants convicted of killing female victims are
sentenced to death at a rate of 4.89 per 100 murders, as opposed to only
2.43 per 100 when the victim is male. 4 ' The sentencing rate for black
males convicted of killing female victims is 3.28 per 100 murders, as
opposed to 0.98 per 100 for male victims.'4 ' Considering both race and
gender of the defendant and victim demonstrates that the most likely
(by far) combination to result in a death sentence is a black male
convicted of killing a white female, which results in a breath-taking
death sentencing rate of 15.02 per 100 murders, a rate that is
statistically significant by any measure.' 2
Figure 4 below graphically demonstrates the effect the combined
race and gender of the victim has on sentencing and executions.
Though forty-eight percent of all murders in South Carolina involve an
African American male victim,'43 only 8% of death sentences and 9%
of executions involve African American male victim cases. To the
contrary, only 11% of murders involve a white female victim,'44 but
42% of all death sentences and executions derive from white female
victim cases. 145
137. See infra Appendix A.
138. See Fox, supra note 136.
139. See infra Appendix A and Appendix C.
140. See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A.
141. See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A.
142. See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A.
143. See Fox, supra note 136.
144. See Fox, supra note 136.
145. See infra Appendix A; Appendix C.
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Figure 4
2. Locale
Whether a defendant receives a death sentence for a murder also
largely depends on the location of the crime. As such, discussion of the
"South Carolina death penalty" is a bit of a misnomer. Review of the
available statistical information reveals there is wide variation from
county to county and from judicial circuit to judicial circuit, in whether
the death penalty will be sought, or obtained. Ten of South Carolina's
forty-six (22%) counties have never produced a death sentence.'46
Other counties, even though they are relatively large and have, at least
comparatively speaking, significantly more murders, produce very few
death sentences.47 By contrast, one quarter of all death sentences
imposed in South Carolina arose from just two of the state's forty-six
counties. Fifty-eight of the 233 death sentences 48 came from either
146. These counties are: Allendale, Bamberg, Fairfield, Hampton, Kershaw, Laurens, Lee,
Marion, Marlboro, and McCormick. See infra Appendix A.
147. For example, Richland county (which includes the Columbia, the state capital) is the
third largest county by population, with the tenth highest murder rate, but Richland county has
only obtained seven death sentences and four executions.
148. This number includes death sentences obtained after the reversal of an original death
sentence.
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Lexington or Horry County. 149 Lexington County has produced thirty-
five death sentences and Horry County twenty-three. 50 These counties
also have high reversal rates; error was found in twenty-three of
Lexington County's thirty-five death sentences (66%), I5 1 and in
seventeen of Horry County's twenty-three death sentences (74%).152
Murder rates in these, and other counties, demonstrate that the murder
rate (number of murders relative to the population within a county)
does not explain the high number of death sentences in those counties.
Lexington County has the twenty-seventh highest murder rate and
Horry County has the tenth highest murder rate while they account for
the first and second highest number of death sentences, respectively. 153
On the contrary, the likelihood of a county seeking and obtaining
a death sentence depends largely on the individual solicitor in charge
of criminal prosecutions for the Judicial Circuit in which the county
lies. 154 Four solicitors since 1976 have been responsible for obtaining
more than one-third of all modern era death sentences in South
Carolina. 155 Walter Bailey's term as the First Judicial Circuit Solicitor
149. See infra Appendix A.
150. Id.
151. Id. In Lexington County, thirty-five death sentences have been imposed on twenty-five
individuals. Id. Nineteen of the twenty-five individuals had their death sentence reversed at least
once. See id. Eleven of the individuals received sentences of life imprisonment after reversal and
one person was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter and released after reversal. Id. Six
individuals currently remain on death row, one of whom has had his sentence overturned and is
currently awaiting resentencing. See infra Appendix B. Despite having the highest number of
death sentences in the state, only four individuals from Lexington County have been executed,
two of whom were volunteers. See infra Appendix C. One individual, Larry Eugene Bell, received
a death sentence in Lexington County but was executed for a Saluda County crime prior to the
completion of the appellate review of the Lexington County death sentence. See id. Two cases
were never reviewed by any court because the inmate died prior to any judicial review. See infra
Appendix A.
152. See infra Appendix A. In Horry County, twenty-three death sentences have been
imposed on eighteen individuals. See id. Sixteen of the eighteen individuals had their death
sentence reversed at least once. Id. Eleven of those reversals resulted in a sentence of life
imprisonment. Id. Four individuals remain on death row, one of whom had his sentence
overturned in post-conviction proceedings and is awaiting the outcome of the State's appeal of
that decision. See infra Appendix B. Only two individuals from Horry County have been
executed, one of whom was a volunteer. See infra Appendix C. One case was never reviewed by
any court because the inmate died prior to judicial review of his resentencing. See infra Appendix
A.
153. These rates are based on the number of solved homicides and the population within the
counties from 1976 through 2007 (the last year for which the data are available). See Fox, supra
note 136; UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/en.html.
154. Each judicial circuit within South Carolina elects a solicitor for a term of four years. S.C.
Code § 1-7-310. There ie no term limits for solicitors in South Carolina.
155. See infra Appendix A. Walter Bailey served as the First Judicial Circuit Solicitor from
1992-2003 and obtained sixteen death sentences (80% of all death sentences obtained within the
First Judicial Circuit). Charles Condon served as the Ninth Judicial Circuit Solicitor from 1980-
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(Calhoun, Dorchester, and Orangeburg Counties) is especially
informative. Bailey was elected solicitor in 1992. Prior to his election,
only two death sentences had been obtained in the circuit since 1977-
one in 1981 and one in 1984.56 Bailey served as solicitor for eleven
years, until 2003, and obtained sixteen death sentences.'57 Since
Bailey's retirement in 2003, only two death sentences have been
imposed in the First Judicial Circuit-one in 2006 and one in 2008.158
Thus, Bailey's decisions as Circuit Solicitor account for 80% of the
death sentences in the First Judicial Circuit. Former Ninth Judicial
Circuit (Charleston and Berkeley Counties) Solicitor Charles Condon
similarly accounts for 80% of the death sentences imposed in that
circuit. Condon served as solicitor for thirteen years, from 1980 to 1993,
and obtained sixteen death sentences. 5 9 Prior to his term as solicitor,
only one death sentence had been obtained, and after his tenure only
three death sentences have been imposed in the circuit. 61
Also notable is Eleventh Judicial Circuit (Edgefield, Lexington,
McCormick, and Saluda Counties) Solicitor Donald Myers, who has
not only accounted for all death sentences within the judicial circuit,
but has obtained 17% of all death sentences within the state in the
modern era.' 6' Myers was elected solicitor in 1977 162 and prosecuted the
first modern era death penalty case in the state, obtaining death
sentences against co-defendants J.D. Gleaton and Larry Gilbert on
October 7, 1977.63 Myers was reelected every four years since that time
(although he has announced that he will not run for reelection in 2016
and will retire when his successor takes office in January of 2017) and
has obtained a total of thirty-nine death sentences. 64 As a result, the
1993 and obtained sixteen death sentences (80% of all death sentences obtained within the Ninth
Judicial Circuit). Donald Myers has served as the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Solicitor for the entire
modern era of the death penalty (1977-present) obtained all thirty-nine of the death sentences
within the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. Robert Arial served as the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit
Solicitor from 1997-2011 and obtained ten death sentences (59% of all death sentences obtained
within the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit). Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See infra Appendix A.
161. Id.
162. Adam Beam, Emotional Life Raft for Donnie Myers, THE STATE (Nov. 26, 2006),
http://www.thestate.com/incoming/article14405219.html.
163. See infra Appendix A.
164. See infra Appendix A; Beam, supra note 163; Andy Shain & Tim Flach, Veteran
Lexington Prosecutor Myers Retiring, THE STATE, Mar. 15, 2016,
http://www.thestate.com/news/local/article66304792.html.
2016]
208 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 11:1&2
Eleventh Judicial Circuit has produced the most death sentences of any
of South Carolina's sixteen Judicial Circuits, with the next highest
circuit producing only twenty-five death sentences during the same
time. "'65
Just as murder rates cannot explain the high number of death
sentences in various counties, neither can they explain the high number
of death sentences by these solicitors. From 1977 to 2007, the average
death-sentencing rate in South Carolina was 1.96 death sentences per
100 murders. 66 Solicitor Myers has the highest death-sentencing rate
with a rate of 6.80 death sentences per 100 murders. 67 Solicitors Bailey
and Condon have similarly high death-sentencing rates of 4.79 and
2.52, respectively, death sentences per 100 murders. 68
3. Aggravating Circumstances and "Narrowing"
Though Justice Breyer did not specifically address the
constitutionally required narrowing function of statutory aggravating
circumstances, Furman mandates that a valid capital punishment
scheme must genuinely narrow the pool of death eligible defendants.
Unfortunately, the South Carolina death penalty fails to do so and thus
permits the type of arbitrary imposition of the death penalty
condemned by the Supreme Court.
In order to sentence an individual to death, the jury or judge
(depending on the fact finder) must first determine that the State
proved the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance
165. See infra Appendix A. The Fifteenth Circuit (Horry and Georgetown Counties) has
imposed twenty-five death sentences on twenty individuals since 1977. See id.
166. These rates are based on the number of solved homicides and the death sentences
imposed within the circuits from 1976 through 2007 (the last year for which the data are available).
See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A.
167. See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A. This difference in sentencing rates has
practical implications. For example, Raymond Patterson was charged with murder and armed
robbery committed in a parking lot in Lexington County, which is in Solicitor Myers' judicial
circuit. Had Patterson committed the crime three or four parking spots away, he would have been
in Richland County, within the Fifth Judicial Circuit. The sentencing rate in the Fifth Judicial
Circuit is a mere 0.53 per 100 murders as compared to the Eleventh Judicial Circuit's rate of 6.80
under Solicitor Myers. See Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and
Location on Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV.
161, 206 (2006); Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A.
168. See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A. The fourth highest producing solicitor,
Robert Arial of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit (Greenville and Pickens Counties), served as
solicitor from 1997 to 2011 and had a slightly lower death-sentencing rate of 1.97; however, he
served as solicitor in more recent years when the use of the death penalty declined throughout
the state. See infra Section IV.E. During the time Arial was solicitor, the state average death-
sentencing rate was only 1.28 death sentences per 100 murders. See Fox, supra note 136; infra
Appendix A.
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beyond a reasonable doubt. 169 In the four decades since the statute was
enacted, the number of aggravating circumstances has increased from
seven, with one aggravating factor including a list of eight offenses that
could make a murder death eligible if it occurred during the
commission of the offense, 70 to twelve aggravating circumstances with
one including eleven subparts, for a total of twenty-two circumstances
that make a murder "death eligible."'' A 2010 study found the
169. S.C. Code § 16-3-20(B).
170. The original statute contained seven statutory aggravating factors. 1977 S.C. Acts 177.
The first of these aggravating factors included a list of subparts making a murder death-eligible if
it occurred during the commission of any one of eight different offenses: rape, assault with intent
to ravish, kidnapping, burglary, robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, larceny with use of a
deadly weapon, housebreaking, and killing by poison. The remaining six statutory aggravating
factors were: the murder was committed by a person with a prior conviction for murder; the
offender "knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by
means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person"; the murder was committed for the purpose of receiving money or a thing of monetary
value; the murder of a judicial officer, solicitor, or other officer of the court (current or former)
during or because of the conduct of his or her official duties; the offender either committed or
caused to be committed murder -for-hire; and, the murder of a peace officer, corrections officer,
or fireman while engaged in the performance of his or her official duties.
171. The legislature expanded the list of aggravating circumstances on numerous occasions:
* In 1978, physical torture was added to the list of concomitant crimes that made a
murder death-eligible. 1978 S.C. Acts 555 § 1.
* In 1986, the Legislature added two more aggravating factors: "[m]urder wherein
two or more persons are murdered by the defendant by one act or pursuant to one
scheme or course of conduct," and murder of a child eleven years old or younger.
1986 S.C. Acts 462 § 27.
* In 1990, the list was again expanded to include murder during the commission of
drug trafficking, and murder of a family member of a judicial officer, a peace
officer, a corrections officer, or a fireman with "intent to impede or retaliate against
the official." 1990 S.C. Acts 604 § 15.
* In 1995, dismemberment of a person was added as an aggravating factor. 1995 S.C.
Acts 83 § 10.
* In 1996, the Legislature added an entirely new aggravating factor: "[t]he murder of
a witness or potential witness committed at any time during the criminal process
for the purpose of impeding or deterring prosecution of any crime." 1996 S.C. Acts
317 § 1.
* In 2002, the factor covering peace and correction officers was expanded to include
"[t]he murder of a federal, state, or local law enforcement officer or former federal,
state, or local law enforcement officer, peace officer or former peace officer,
corrections officer or former corrections officer, including a county or municipal
corrections officer or a former county or municipal corrections officer, a county or
municipal detention facility employee or former county or municipal detention
facility employee, or fireman or former fireman during or because of the
performance of his official duties." 2002 S.C. Acts 224 § 1.
* In 2006, as part of the "Sex Offender Accountability and Protection of Minors Act
of 2006," the Legislature expanded the list again to make sexually violent predators
who commit murder death penalty eligible. 2006 S.C. Acts 342 § 2.
* In 2007, the Legislature added arson in the first degree to the list of concomitant
crimes that make a murder death eligible. 2007 S.C. Acts 101 § 1.
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increased number of aggravating circumstances, coupled with the
expansive judicial interpretation of several of the aggravating factors,'72
resulted in a system where a vast majority of all murders are death
eligible.'73 Specifically, the study found that 76% of the homicides that
occurred in Charleston County between 2002 and 2007, and 77% of the
homicides that occurred in Richland County between 2000 and 2008
were death eligible.'74
Since South Carolina began requiring proof of an aggravating
circumstance as a prerequisite to a death sentence in 1977,
sentencers -either juries or judges-have found an average of two
aggravating circumstances per case.'75 In eighty-three of 233 cases, a
defendant has been sentenced to death upon the finding of a single
aggravating factor. 7 6 The single most prevalent aggravating factor in
cases where the death penalty has been imposed is murder during the
commission of armed robbery.'77 The armed robbery aggravating
factor was found in 115 cases; in 39 of those cases, armed robbery was
the only aggravating factor found.78 Murder during the commission of
kidnapping has been found in seventy-one cases. ' 9 The aggravating
circumstance of murder during the commission of armed larceny (an
offense which does not exist under South Carolina law) was found in
forty-seven cases. 80 The next most found aggravating circumstances
are murder during the commission of burglary (46), rape (or criminal
sexual conduct) (46), and physical torture (38). T Murder during the
And in 2010, the Legislature acted again, adding trafficking in persons to the list of
concomitant crimes that make a murder death eligible. 2010 S.C. Acts 289 § 4.
172. See John H. Blume, et al., When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina's Return to the
Unconstitutional, Standardless Capital Sentencing Regime of the Pre-Furman Era, 4 CHARLESTON
L. REV. 479, 495-98 (2010) (describing the expansive judicial interpretation of the aggravating
factors of physical torture, kidnapping, attempted robbery, and prior conviction of murder).
173. Id. at 498-500.
174. Id. at 499-500.
175. Appendix D to this Article reports the aggravating circumstances found in all death
penalty trials resulting in a death sentence, including cases in which an individual was retried after
reviewing courts reversed the original death sentence.
176. See infra Appendix D.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. Rounding out the list of aggravating circumstances found are: murder of two or more
persons (30), murder of a law enforcement officer (21), prior murder conviction (12), risk of harm
to more than one person in a public place (11), murder for the purpose of receiving monetary
value (11), murder of a child under eleven (11), murder as an agent for another person (4), murder
by poison (1), murder during commission of arson (1), murder of a judicial officer (1), and murder
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commission of trafficking in persons, drug trafficking, and
dismemberment, murder of a law enforcement or judicial officer's
family member, and murder by a sexually violent predator have never
been found as aggravating circumstances. 8
2
D. Cruel-Excessive Delays
Justice Breyer found that "problems of reliability and unfairness
almost inevitably lead to a third independent constitutional problem:
excessively long periods of time that individuals typically spend on
death row, alive but under sentence of death."'83 Delays are created by
the constitutional requirements surrounding the imposition of the
death penalty, which require implementation of safeguards that must
be observed when a person's life is at stake, but "[t]hese procedural
necessities take time to implement."'84 The constitutional problem with
lengthy delays are twofold: (1) the delay itself "subjects death row
inmates to decades of especially severe, dehumanizing conditions of
confinement," and (2) "lengthy delay undermines the death penalty's
penological rational." '85
Lengthy delays are common in South Carolina death penalty cases.
The men currently on death row have been there for an average of 14.5
years. 86 The two longest serving death row inmates were originally
sentenced to death more than thirty years ago in 1983 and 1984.87 The
average time an inmate served on death row between his original
sentence and his execution was 11.8 years-13.1 years if the
"volunteers" are not included in the calculation. 88 Two men served
more than twenty years on death row prior to their executions (J.D.
Gleaton and Larry Gilbert) and twenty-one of the forty-three men
executed served more than a dozen years between their original
sentence and ultimate execution. 89 As a result of lengthy delays, nine
death row inmates, 5% of all those sentenced to death, died while on
of a witness (1). Id. Two aggravating circumstances that are no longer part of the statute, murder
during the commission of housebreaking and murder during the commission of assault with intent
to ravish were found in nine and three cases, respectively. Id.
182. Id.
183. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2765.
186. Calculated as of December 31, 2015. See id.
187. Id.
188. See Appendix C, infra.
189. See id.
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death row awaiting execution: six died of natural causes, one was killed
by another inmate, and two committed suicide. 9 '
Delays in carrying out an execution inevitably result from the
complex review process constitutionally mandated in death penalty
cases. 9 ' As noted above, more than 60% of all death sentences are
overturned on appeal. In many cases, an inmate granted a new trial is
once again sentenced to death, beginning the appellate process anew.
In South Carolina, five individuals have been sentenced to death three
times because their initial two trials were found to contain errors
warranting reversal.'92 Of those five men, three had their third death
sentences overturned and received sentences of less than death,"93 but
not before each of them spent two or three decades on death row.'94
These delays, as Justice Breyer noted, undermine the penological goals
of the death penalty-namely the deterrent and retribution
justifications for the death penalty because an offender is more likely
to have his sentence overturned or die of natural causes than to be
executed after receiving a death sentence.'95
Justice Breyer also noted that the severe conditions of confinement
make the delays especially cruel on the individual offender. 9 6 The
same is true in South Carolina where all death row inmates are kept in
isolation for twenty-three hours a day. This long-term solitary
confinement is well documented to "produce[] numerous deleterious
harms."'97 As a result, at least in part, of solitary confinement, severe
mental illness is widespread on South Carolina's death row.'98 A recent
study by the Death Penalty Resource & Defense Center'99 found that
190. Id. Two were African American and seven were white. See id.
191. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015) ("[D]elay is in part a problem that the
Constitution's own demands create.").
192. See Appendix A, infra (showing Louis Truesdale, Edward Lee Elmore, Raymond
Patterson, Jr., Ernest Riddle, and Freddie Owens were sentenced to death three times each).
193. Edward Lee Elmore, Raymond Patterson, Jr., and Ernest Riddle. See id.
194. Edward Lee Elmore served twenty-nine years on death row and was ultimately release
after serving thirty-one years in prison despite strong evidence of his innocence. See supra note
85 and accompanying text. Raymond Patterson, Jr. served more than seventeen years before
being sentenced to life imprisonment upon the third reversal of his death sentence. See infra
Appendix A. Ernest Riddle spent twenty-one years on death row before receiving a thirty-year
sentence upon the third reversal of his death sentence. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
195. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2767-69.
196. Id. at 2765.
197. Id.
198. Despite constitutional protections against executing juveniles or the intellectually
disabled, and despite suffering from similar mental impairments, the severely mentally ill are still
eligible for execution in South Carolina.
199. The Death Penalty Resource & Defense Center has since been renamed Justice 360.
The organization's mission is to promote equality in capital cases in South Carolina. It tracks data
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of the forty-eight death row inmates at the time of the study, thirty-four
(70%) were severely mentally disabled.211 Mental illness -including
schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive
disorder, and bipolar disorder-was the most common mental
disability, followed by brain trauma/organic brain damage and
intellectual disability.20 ' Twelve inmates suffered from multiple types
of these three conditions.2 2
E. Unusual-Decline in Use of the Death Penalty
Finally, Justice Breyer found that the death penalty is made
unusual by the decline in usage of the death penalty.2 3 Justice Breyer
specifically found that "30 States have either formally abolished the
death penalty or have not conducted an execution in more than eight
years" and "9 have conducted fewer than five [executions] in that
time," leaving "11 States in which it is fair to say that capital
punishment is not 'unusual. '' 2°4 Justice Breyer counted South Carolina
as one of the states in which capital punishment is not unusual based
on the fact that there had been more than five executions in the past
eight years. However, if Justice Breyer took a closer look at South
Carolina, he would see that the use of the death penalty within South
Carolina has declined significantly and is becoming "unusual" in
practice.
The number and rate of death sentences in South Carolina has
decreased dramatically in recent years. Death sentences per year in the
1970s were low as the state's prosecutors began working with the new
death penalty statute .2  By 1981, the new machinery of death was up
and running at full speed and the state had ten death sentences that
year.20 6 From 1981 through 1996, the state averaged nine death
sentences each year, with a high in 1986 of fifteen death sentences.2 v
The number of death sentences per year declined between 1997 and
related to all facets of the South Carolina death penalty and has done so since the 1980s.
200. The Death Penalty Resource & Defense Center, Mental Disability and the Death
Penalty: Why South Carolina Should Ban the Execution of the Severely Mentally Disabled (Aug.
2014), on file with the authors.
201. Id. at 6.
202. Id.
203. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2773 (2015).
204. Id.
205. See infra Appendix A. From 1977 to 1980, the state had between one and seven death
sentences per year. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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2007, averaging only six death sentences per year with a high of eight
death sentences in 1998 and 2001.2o8 Since 2008, however, the decrease
has been even more dramatic with an average of fewer than two death
sentences per year.0 9 Indeed, the state went four of the last five years
(2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015) without a single death sentence
imposed."'
Death Sentences by Year
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The decrease in death sentences cannot be explained by a
decreasing number of murders during the same time period -though
the number of murders per year has decreased slightly since the
1990s.21' As the graph below demonstrates, the number of death
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. Notably, during the three consecutive years with no death sentences, thirty-one cases
where the State originally sought the death penalty were resolved with sentences of less than
death. See infra Appendix H.
211. South Carolina's murder rate in 2013 was 6.2 murders for every 100,000 people.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime -in-the-u.s/2013/crime -in-the-
u.s.2013/tables/4tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table 4 crime in the united states by region geogr
aphic-division and state 2012-2013.xls. This number includes non-negligent manslaughter. Id.
This placed South Carolina as the state with the sixth highest murder rate nationally; the national
average was 4.5 per 100,000. Id. Like most states, the South Carolina murder rate has decreased
since the mid-1990s, though the decrease in the murder rate has been less consistent in South
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sentences per murder has decreased significantly from its peak in 1986,
when the state saw 4.5 death sentences per 100 murders.2 2 Since 2008,
South Carolina has only imposed .45 death sentences per 100
murders.2 3
Death Sentencing Rate (Per 100 Murders)
1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
-South Carolina -National
Figure 6
South Carolina's death sentencing rate has historically been about
average compared to other death penalty jurisdictions. About 1.6
death sentences have been imposed per 100 murders in South Carolina
since 1977.214 The average for all death penalty jurisdictions is 1.5 per
100 murders. However, there have been only two death sentences in
Carolina than the national trend. In 1996, South Carolina's murder rate was 9 per 100,000. The
lowest murder rate in South Carolina since 1996 was in 2010 when the murder rate was 5.4 per
100,000. See id.
212. Death sentencing rates were calculated by comparing the number of death sentences
from infra Appendix A and the number of murders in South Carolina and other death penalty
jurisdictions as reported in the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Annual Crime Reports.
DISASTERCENTER.COM, United States Crime Rates 1960-2013,
http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/uscrime.htm [hereinafter FBI Crime Report].
213. See FBI Crime Report, supra note 212; Appendix A.
214. See FBI Crime Report, supra note 212; Appendix A.
215. See FBI Crime Report, supra note 212; Appendix A.
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the last five years. Murder statistics are not available for the most
recent years, but with such a low number of death sentences, South
Carolina's recent death sentencing rate is surely lower than the average
in other death penalty jurisdictions.
Death Sentencing Rates by State, 1977-2013
Death Sentence
Rate (per 100 Death Sentences Murders
State murders) 1977-2013 1977-2013
Delaware 3914 49 1.252
Oklahoma 3.552 309 8,700
Idaho 3.440 42 1.221
Alabama 3)0JM 456 14,756
Nevada 2.716 149 5487
Arizona 2,442 36 1231
Florida 2.256 939 41,617
North Carolina 2.091 447 21,377
Oregon (1978-present) 1.891 75 3,966
Mississippi 1685 174 10,326
Arkansas 1,624 118 7,265
South Carolina -623 194 11.955
Ohio .512 333 22026
Texas 18L 958 64,573
Pennsylvania 1,480 374 25-269
Nebraska 1.432 28 1955
Missouri 1.236 197 15,935
Tennessee 1.067 174 16,313
Utah 0.976 19 1,946
Kentucky 0.957 85 K,878
Georgia 0.945 233 24,646
Virginia (.938 151 16,096
California 0.923 923 99,999
Illinois (1977-2011) 0,850 304 35,755
Louisiana 0.721 162 22471
Indiana 0.718 98 13,657
New Jersey (1982-2007) 0.571 57 9,984
Washington 0.516 40 7,755
Maryland 0.305 53 17388
New Mexico (1979-2009) 0.297 14 4,718
Colorado 0,227 15 6,620
Figure 7216
216. See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 By State By Year, DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008;
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The recent decrease in death sentences can be attributed, at least
in part, to the creation of the Capital Trial Division of the South
Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense. The Capital Trial Division
was created in 2008 with a staff of two lawyers and two mitigation
specialists and today is staffed by three attorneys and one
investigator. 217 The mission of the office is to provide representation to
capital defendants at less cost to the State than through the
appointment of private attorneys and to provide consultation and
training for other lawyers representing South Carolina defendants
facing the death penalty.218 In practice, an attorney from the Capital
Trial Division has been involved, either by formal appointment or
informally prior to the issuance of a death notice, in many -43% since
2008-of the potential capital cases along with either a local public
defender or a private attorney.
Since 2008, the Capital Trial Division has worked on thirty
potential capital cases in which the defendant has since been
sentenced.219 Of those thirty cases, only three resulted in death
sentences, one of which was overturned on direct appeal and the
defendant subsequently accepted a plea to life without parole.22 ° More
than three-quarters of the cases handled by the Capital Trial Division
(77%) have been resolved prior to trial either through a plea
agreement to a sentence of life or less, withdrawal of the death penalty
as a sentencing option prior to trial, or the solicitor's decision not to
seek the death penalty in a death eligible case.22' Overall, since 2008,
cases in which the State was likely to seek the death penalty have been
resolved prior to trial without a death sentence 80% of the time.222 The
Capital Trial Division credits its early defense involvement in potential
death penalty cases with the ability to resolve so many cases pretrial.
In many instances, the Division or other lawyers trained by the
Division become involved in homicide cases well before the State
officially indicates its intention to seek the death penalty, allowing the
lawyers to conduct factual and mitigation investigation early on for use
in negotiations with the solicitors. This often allows solicitors to decide
FBI Crime Report, supra note 212.
217. See SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, CAPITAL TRIAL
DIVISION, https://www.sccid.sc.gov/about -us/capital-defenders.
218. Id.
219. Appendix H to this Article lists all of the pretrial death penalty case outcomes since the
Capital Trial Division began tracking death penalty cases in 2008.
220. See infra Appendix H.
221. See id.
222. See id.
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a case is not "death-worthy" before ever making a public commitment
to seek death, making it easier to decide not to seek the penalty. Even
when solicitors formally announce that they intend to seek death, early
involvement by defense counsel provides both sides with more
information to use in plea negotiations, the majority of the time
resulting in a plea to less than death.223
The number of executions per year has also decreased in recent
years. Similar to the national trend, South Carolina carried out the
highest number of executions in the mid to late 1990s.224 The highest
number of executions per year occurred in 1996, with six executions,
and 1998, with seven executions. Since the late 1990s, the execution
rate in South Carolina has declined.225 Since 2010, South Carolina has
carried out only one execution and that individual waived his pending
appeals in order to be executed in 2011.226 This trend can be explained,
in significant part, by the reduced number of death sentences over the
last fifteen years, the number of reversals resulting from prejudicial
error, and the Supreme Court's creation of categorical bars to
execution for juveniles and persons with intellectual disability.227
223. Capital trial units in other states have produced similar results. See, e.g., Larry O'Dell,
Study: Better Legal Defense Leads to Fewer Death Penalties, AP, Oct. 19, 2015, available at
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/e44f4c549b6b4b5297191386abcc399/study-better-legal-defense-
leads-fewer-death-penalties (Virginia); Greg Land, 'Life Without Parole' Leads to Shrinking
Death Penalty Pipeline, DAILY REPORT, Dec. 16, 2015,
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id-1202744912371/Life-Without-Parole-Leads-to-Shrinking-
Death-Penalty-Pipeline?mcode-0&curindex-0&curpage-ALL (Georgia).
224. See infra Appendix C; DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, EXECUTIONS BY
YEAR SINCE 1976, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year.
225. See infra Appendix C.
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 120-21, and accompanying text.
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Figure 8
The death penalty in South Carolina, like the rest of the country,
has become increasingly concentrated geographically.2 Only fourteen
of South Carolina's forty-six counties have sentenced a defendant to
death in the last decade.229 Only four counties (Lexington, Horry,
Spartanburg, and Greenville) have imposed more than one death
sentence in the last ten years.230 Indeed, ten South Carolina counties
have not imposed a death sentence since 1976.231 Thus, for most of
South Carolina, use of the death penalty has become unusual.
228. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2774 (2015) (noting that "66 of America's 3,143
counties accounted for approximately 50% of all death sentences imposed").
229. See infra Appendix A.
230. See id.
231. See id.
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V. OBSERVATIONS BASED ON THE DATA
Despite forty years of legislative and judicial regulation, by all of
Justice Breyer's measures of constitutional validity -unreliability,
arbitrariness, delay and infrequency -the South Carolina death
penalty is an abysmal failure. The "safeguards" put in place at trial for
the purpose of improving the quality of representation (e.g.,
appointment of two qualified attorneys, special funding procedures,
etc.), 232 and a number of decisions attempting to regulate the conduct
of prosecutors and make jury decision-making more reliable have not
reduced the amount of error in the system; appellate courts overturn
232. See S.C. Code § 16-3-26.
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death sentences in approximately two out of three cases. Even after an
initial reversal, death penalty cases remain error-prone, resulting in
(sometimes) three or four death penalty trials of the same person. Most
people sentenced to death eventually end up with life sentences (or
less); however, even when a death sentenced inmate runs the entire
appellate gauntlet, there is no guarantee the case is error-free, the
system worked properly or even that we are executing the person who
committed the crime.233 Race, gender, and geography-more than the
heinousness of the offense -determine who is sentenced to death, and
innocent defendants have spent years on death row before obtaining
their freedom. The South Carolina death penalty-in sum-is still
arbitrary after all these years.
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court allowed states to resume
the use of the death penalty on the assumption that it would be
imposed only in appropriate cases (i.e., not on your "average
murderers") in a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner. As we
believe we have demonstrated in this article that is by no means the
case. It is clear, after decades of trying in vain, that the South Carolina
death penalty system is (literally) fatally flawed. And, given both the
pre-Furman and post-Gregg capital punishment experience, it is
equally clear that there is no fix or cure for its ailments. Now is the time
for the United States Supreme Court, the South Carolina Supreme
Court or the General Assembly to bring the experiment with capital
punishment to an end.
If, instead (as is more likely), the South Carolina death penalty
continues to limp along before meeting its inevitable demise, the
appropriate stakeholders should at a minimum attempt to "fix" the
major systemic flaws: (1) the failure to meaningfully narrow the pool
of individuals eligible for the death penalty; (2) the failure to eliminate
significant race and gender effects in the imposition of the penalty; and
(3) the lack of meaningful appellate proportionality review. First, as
discussed above, virtually all murders are "death eligible;" i.e., a
prosecutor could seek the death penalty should she choose to do so-
in more than 75% of murder cases given both the expansion of the
233. See, e.g., Johnson v. Catoe, 345 S.C. 389, 548 S.E.2d 587 (2001) (denying a motion for a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence of actual innocence). Johnson was executed in 2002
despite calls for clemency, including from members of the victim's family, based on evidence of
his innocence. See Application for Executive Clemency Submitted on Behalf of Richard Charles
Johnson, http://deathpenaltyusa.org/usa/images/clemency/johnson-richardcharles.pdf; Rick
Brundrett & Cliff Leblanc, Lethal Injection Ends Life of Convicted Killer, THE STATE (May 4,
2002).
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number of aggravating circumstances and the broad interpretation of
several commonly utilized aggravating circumstances (e.g., murder in
the commission of kidnapping and murder during the commission of
physical torture). Aggravating circumstances -in theory-play a
"constitutionally necessary function" in defining capital murder in a
way that both "genuinely narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty" and "reasonably justif[ies] the imposition of a more
severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder." '234 In South Carolina they clearly do not. Capital punishment
is not reserved for the "worst of the worst" but all too often is imposed
on the "average murderer."
One possible solution that would at least reduce arbitrariness
would be to reduce the number of aggravating circumstances to
capture only the worst crimes.235 For example, the legislature could
limit the application of the death penalty to persons with prior murder
convictions who kill a prison guard or to serial killers.236 Doing so
would limit opportunities for race and gender bias and prosecutorial
excess to infect the determination of who should live or die as Furman
and Gregg originally intended.237 In addition to restricting the number
of death eligible offenses, the number of death eligible offenders
should also be limited. The category of offenders most in need of a new
exclusion from capital punishment given existing Eighth Amendment
precedent and their intuitive lack of "death-worthiness" are persons
with severe mental illness.238 Such a limitation is a natural extension of
the bans on executing juveniles and the intellectually disabled.239 The
234. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
235. See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1, 29-32 (1995) (proposing to limit the number of aggravating circumstances to
"ensure that the worst members of our society ... are put to death" as a way to remove some of
the objections to capital punishment, such as racial biases effecting sentencing decisions).
236. As currently practiced, remember that the high number of persons sentenced to death
and executed for "garden variety" crimes such as murder during the commission of armed
robbery. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. We do not mean to minimize the
significance of this type of homicide, or any homicide for that matter, but it is hardly subject to
debate that this is not one of the more culpable categories of murder.
237. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976) (holding that aggravating factors
"provide guidance to the sentencing authority and thereby reduce the likelihood that it will
impose a sentence that fairly can be called capricious or arbitrary").
238. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Resolution 122A (Aug. 2006) (recommending that
"defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the time of their offense, they had
a severe mental disorder or disability that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate
the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise rational judgment in
relation to conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law"),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/122AReport.pdf.
239. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People With Mental Illness,
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juvenile and intellectual disability categorical bars were grounded in
the Court's determination that their group characteristics rendered
them less culpable than the average murderer and because, sometimes,
their youth or intellectual disability would actually be held against
them at a capital sentencing proceeding. 2 ° The same is true for the
severely mentally ill-those individuals have similar or even greater
reduced culpability and their illness has been empirically proven to be
viewed by jurors as an aggravating rather than mitigating factor.24 '
In early 2015, a bill was proposed in the South Carolina legislature
that would prohibit the execution of a person who had a severe mental
disability at the time of the commission of the crime.242 The bill defines
severe mental disability as "a severe mental illness that significantly
impairs a person's capacity to do any of the following: (i) appreciate
the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of the person's conduct; (ii)
exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct; or (iii) conform the
person's conduct to the requirements of the law. . ." or as "dementia or
traumatic brain injury that results in significantly sub-average
intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with significant
limitations in adaptive functioning. '243 Adopting a ban on executing
the severely mentally ill would be another step towards ensuring the
worst (most culpable) offenders receive the death penalty, as opposed
to a random selection of the most vulnerable offenders.
Another necessary next step is to attempt to minimize the
significant race effects driving death sentencing in South Carolina. The
General Assembly could accomplish this by amending the state post-
conviction relief statute244 to allow courts to consider whether race was
a significant factor in the decision to seek death against the defendant.
33 N.M. L. REV. 293, 293 (2003).
240. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319
(2002).
241. South Carolina law defines the presence of a mental disability as mitigating evidence;
S.C. Code § 16-3-20(b)(7) (listing "[t]he age or mentality ofthe defendant at the time ofthe crime"
as a statutory mitigating circumstance), however, empirical studies have conclusively
demonstrated that juries tend to view mental illness and disability as aggravating factors rather
than reasons to spare the defendant from death. See e.g., Kevin M. Doyle, Lethal Crapshoot: The
Fatal Unreliability of the Penalty Phase, 11 U. PA. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 275 (2008); Steven
Garvey, Aggravation And Mitigation In Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1538 (1998); Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The
Improper Consideration Of Mitigating Factors In Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L. J.
409 (1990); Ellen Fells Berkman, Mental Illness As An Aggravating Circumstance In Capital
Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291 (1989).
242. H. 3535, 121 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2015).
243. Id.
244. S.C. Code § 17-27-160.
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Existing law allows a court to order a new trial or sentencing hearing
when there has been racial bias in jury selection,245 or racially charged
arguments made to the jury,246 but makes it virtually impossible for a
defendant to prove that the decision to seek death was based on race
by using statistics to prove racial bias in a solicitor's decision on the
death penalty. 247 A Racial Justice Act enacted in North Carolina in
2009 outlined specific evidence and procedures a defendant could use
to prove his death sentence was the result of racial bias.248 If a
defendant is able to meet his burden of proof, then the death sentence
is vacated and a life sentence imposed.249 South Carolina should adopt
a similar provision to ensure that race is not a determining factor in
who receives the death penalty.
Finally, the South Carolina Supreme Court could remove some of
the arbitrariness from the current death penalty regime by taking
seriously its statutorily required proportionality review. Under current
practice, the court, in considering whether a death sentence is
245. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). This, of course, is all in theory. In reality,
solicitors use their peremptory challenges in capital cases overwhelmingly against jurors of color
and thus a not-insignificant number of African American South Carolina death row inmates were
sentenced to death by all-white juries. See Ann Eisenberg, The Conscience of the Community:
Pre- Trial Removal of Women and African -American Jurors in South Carolina Capital Punishment
Cases, 1998-2012 (unpublished manuscript), on file with authors. Through their work on South
Carolina death penalty cases, the authors have identified at least three African Americans
currently on death row as a result of a sentence imposed by an all-white jury: Johnny Bennett,
Richard Moore, and Kevin Mercer.
246. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,643 (1974). Again, this protection is largely
theoretical; in fact, solicitors use explicit or implicit appeals to race in many cases and the courts
turn a blind eye to it. The authors currently represent an individual on South Carolina's death
row whose capital trial (before an all-white jury) included remarks by the Solicitor referring to
the large African American defendant as "King Kong," a "caveman," a "big old bear," and a
"beast of burden." The South Carolina Supreme Court refused to reverse the defendant's death
sentence based on these comments, even though counsel uncovered evidence that one of the
jurors was racially biased and referred to the defendant as a "Nigger." See State v. Bennett, 369
S.C. 219, 231 33, 632 S.E.2d 281, 288 89 (2006); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bennett v. State,
No. 2009-145366 (Oct. 7, 2010); Order Denying Certiorari, Bennett v. State, No. 2009-145366
(Nov. 7, 2013).
247. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In fact, only one South Carolina case has
been successful in proving racial bias in the decision to see the death penalty and that was only
because the assistant solicitor admitted that the decision to seek death in a black victim case was
made in order because "I felt like the black community would be upset if we did not seek the
death penalty because there were two black victims in this case." Kelly v. State, No. 99-CP-42-
1174 (Oct. 6, 2003) (Trial Court Order Granting Post-Conviction Relief).
248. N.C. S.L. 2009-464.
249. See id. The North Carolina Racial Justice Act was repealed in 2013 out of a "fear of too
much justice," McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 399 (1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting), after three
African-American death row inmates established race played a role in their capital trials. See N.C.
S.L. 2013-154; Kim Severson, North Carolina Repeals Law Allowing Racial Bias Claim in Death
Penalty Challenges, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2013), at A13.
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disproportionate, reviews "similar cases" which it defines as other
cases "with an actual conviction and sentence of death rendered by a
trier of fact. '25" But defining "similar cases" as those in which a death
sentence was imposed is tautological; the court is always able to find a
case with similar aggravating circumstances and thus the death
sentence is always proportionate to the crime, regardless of how many
similar cases resulted in life sentences. 25' The court has recognized as
much noting that reviewing only other cases in which a death sentence
was obtained "is largely a self-fulfilling prophesy as simply examining
similar cases where the defendant was sentenced to death will almost
always lead to the conclusion that the death sentence under review is
proportional." 252 But, to date, it has taken no action to engage in a more
robust and meaningful review of whether death sentences are in fact
proportionate to the offense and offender. It would be easy to do so;
the South Carolina Office of Court Administration, the Circuit
Solicitors and Circuit Public Defenders and the Department of
Corrections have -collectively -the data needed to create the pool of
relevant death and life cases. The only thing lacking is the commitment
to monitor the system for disproportionate death sentences.
250. State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 591, 300 S.E.2d 63, 74 (1982).
251. The court generally uses standard language in its opinion to find a death sentence is not
disproportionate:
[Appellant's] convictions and sentences are affirmed. The death sentence was not the result of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and the jury's finding of aggravating
circumstances is supported by the evidence. Further, the death penalty is not excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar capital cases.
See, e.g., State v. Moore, 357 S.C. 458, 593 S.E.2d 608 (2004). The court then goes on to list other
death penalty cases in which the same aggravating circumstances were found as support for the
conclusion that the death sentence was not disproportionate.
252. State v. Dickerson, 395 S.C. 101, 125 n.8 716 S.E.2d 895, 908 n.8 (2011). Because the
issue was not raised on appeal in Dickerson, the court declined to overrule Copeland. Despite
noting its concern with reviewing only cases resulting in a death sentence in its proportionality
review, the Court has continued to do so since Dickerson and, arguably proving the "self-fulfilling
prophecy," has never found a death sentence disproportionate. See, e.g., State v. Inman, 395 S.C.
539, 567-68,720 S.E.2d 31, 46 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
We end where we began. The arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty led a majority of the Supreme Court in Furman to conclude
that the death penalty was a cruel and unusual punishment that
violated the Eighth Amendment. In Gregg, the Court allowed capital
punishment to resume based on its confidence that post-Furman
improvements to state death penalty systems had eliminated that
arbitrariness. That confidence, however, was misplaced. The death
penalty in South Carolina is still arbitrary after all these years.
Publisher's Note: A separate PDF of the appendices below is available
for download from the Duke Law Scholarship Repository, accessible
through: djclpp.law.duke.edu.
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SouthCaron ah Sentences Listoflho Sentencedto Death
1977-2015
Oiginal Sentence
Defendan ctfin County of Circuit of Sentence Date After
Name t Race Race Convicion onvicion Uate Reversal FinalResult
/leatonJ. BM W/M Lxingon 11 10/7/1977 2/26/1980 Exeutd
Gilbert, Lar B/M W/M Lxington 11 10/7/1977 2/26/1980 Exeutd
3 Gil,EncAndre B/M W/M York 16 1977 Life hnpisommen
4Shaw, Joseph Carl W/M W/F Ri.hld 12/16/1977 Exud
W/M
Roach,JamesTerry W/M W/F Rihlnd 121619 Ex d
W/M
TynerRudolph B/M W/F Horry 15 8/11/1978 10/11/1980 DidonDethRow
W/M
PlathJohn W/M B/F B eufort 14 2/9/1979 5/14/1982 Exeutd
8Anold,John W/M B/F Beufort 14 2/9/1979 5/14/1982 Exeutd
9oolsb Sidne Rss W/M W/F Gr uwood 8 1979 Life hprisom unt
t0ooler,Ronald W/M W/F Horry 15 7/20/19 7/23/1981 Exentd(HonyConty)
W/M Coleton 14 6/7/1981
11 Linder, Michael W/M B/M Collton 14 1979 Aquitd
12 H man,WillianGibbs W/M W/M Chal t 10/12/1979 0 Life Imprisoimlent
1 7dai, Slvester B/M B/M York 16 3/3/1980 1/30/1982 Exeutd
IZ Thornson,Albert"Bo" B/M W/M Greeville 13 9/27/1980 Life hprisoint
15 fresdale,Louis B/M W/F Lma.tr 612/11/1980 51198 Exeud
925/ 1987
1 Roberts,SammyDavd W/M 2W/M Brkely 9 1/19/1981 Exeutd
B/M
1 Copeland,HenryWesley W/M 2W/M Brkely 9 1/19/1981 DidonD DthRow
B/M
18 Butler, Horee B/M W/F Chaltn 9 1/26/1981 Life hprisom ent
19 Smart,R.naldFrancis W/M W/M Lxington 11 3/11/1981 Life Imprisoi nt
20 Yates,DaleRoberts W/M W/F Gr-vill 13 5/2/1981 Life hmprisonient
21 Butler,JanesAnthon W/M ASa/M Orangebug 1 3/21/1981 Lifeimprisoimn t
22 Pattersn, Wardell B/M WM York 16 10/29/1980 6/20/1983 Life hopri-nn -t
23 Koon, PaulFinle W/M W/F Aikn 2 6/12/1981 2/18/1983 Lif hlpri-nnent
2 4Sloan,MihaelA. W/M W/F Lxington 11 10/2/1981 Life Imprisonment
2 Elmore,EdwardLee B/M WEF Gr enwood 41911982 4/21984 RIle.sed
2/28/1987'
265 ann,Sterin Barnett B/M W/F York 16 4/26/1982 Life hprisoimn-t
27 Woods,StanleEu-ene B/M W/M Grevill 13 1983 Life hpriso lnt
28 Stea, Rihard B/M W/F Andeon 1 3/14/1983' 1/25/1985 Life mprisonlent
29G askins, onad Hen W/M B/M Richlad 3/26/1983 Exutd
30 Chaffee,Jonathan W/M W/F Florn 12 4/2/19834 Life hprisonment
31 IerrelDaliasClarence W/M W/F Flor-n 12 4/2/19834 Lif hnprisoni -nt
32 Noris, JohnFoster B/M B/F Andron 10 6/10/1983 Life Iiprisoiment
3 [amon, Shelie B/M B/F Ormgebug 1 1/16/1984 Life hprisonnm ut
B/
34 kipperRnaldeRay W/M W/F Horry 15 6/28198 Life hprisonnm ut
3LuasCecil Dyle WM WET York 16 7/27/198 Eeuted
W/M
3
6 
Singleton, Fd B/M W/F Nwbrry 891711983 Eoudlnonptnt
37 SouthRbert W/M W/M Lxington I 1 11/17/1983 Exutd
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APPENDIX A'
SouthCar ahSentences -Listof Thos Sentencedto Death
1977-2015
Orginal Sentence
Defendan ctfin County of Circuit of Sentence Date After
Name t Race Race Convicion onvicion Date Reversal FinalResult
SDratonLero B/M W/F Chiston 9 10/8/1984 4/12/1986 Exentd
4 Pierce, Marcellus,Jr. B/M W/F Ri hlnd 12/7/1984 Lif hnprison nt
45 rown,JessieKeith W/M W/M Sartnbu 1/28/1985 3/24/1987 A qintdofMrdr
46 Middleton, Frank B/M W/ Chleton 9 2/4/1985 11/24/1986 Exentd(forbkkvi tin
F only)
SPatnk,Ga Lee W/M W/M Oon 10 4/15/1985 Lif Imprisonm-nt
4 Matthews,Earl B/M W/F Charml 5/13/1985 4/24/1987 Ex td
49 Arthur, Liune B/M B/M Horry 1 8/8/1985 5/13/1987 LifI -nnmnt
5 Patterson,Raymond,Jr. B/M W/M Lxington 11 9/7/1985 11/7/1987 Lif hmpnisoni nt
2/14/1995
I Cooper, Kanathene B/M W/M Florn 12 10/4/1985 Lif hmpnrsonment
52 Konahrens, Fred W/M W/F Chalton 9 11/19/1985 Exentd
2W/M
53 Riddle, Enest W/M W/F Chrok 2/1/1986 10/1/1987 30Y Sntn
11/15/1991'
5 Hawkins, Calvil B/M W/M Dlmgton 411/17/1985 Lit Imprismn-nt
55 Johnson,Richard W/M B/M Jper 14 2/15/1986.131988 Exnted
56 Howard,Rnnie B/M Ain/F Gi-nvill 13 6/15/1986 Exnted
57 Weldonana B/M Ain/F Gienvill 13 6/15/1986 Life Imnpsom ent
58 BelILarryGene W/M W/F Salnds 11 2127/1986 Exeited(Salnd'County)
W/F Lxington 11 4/2/ 1987
9 BellamyLe Grant B/M B/M Horry 15 6/28/1986 Lif mpnsonmn t
60A tkins,Joseph NA/M B/F Chalton 9 6/28/1986 6/25/1988 Exnted
W/M
61 ReedJerLee B/M W/M Abbevill8 7/22/1986 Life hprisonm i-t
62 Diddle er, Gerald W/M B/M Horry 15 9/13/1986 Life mprisom-nt
61 estVlod W/M W/M Lxington 1110211986 DidonDethRow
64 Coketan, Harold W/M W/F Horry 1 10111986 Life mprisom-nt
65 wensAlvin W/M WM Horry 15 5/19/1986 Lif nIprisonment
66 ain,JamesRussel W/M 2W/M Cheterfild 411/25/1986 Lif Inprisonment
6 Gathers Denetrius B/M B/M Chal- n 3/21/1987 Life npisom-nt
68 Caldwell RiceTil W/M W/M York 16 5/23/1988 Life hnrisolnmint
69lorene,Michael W/M W/M Lxington 11 5/28/1988 9/26/1992 Exnted
70 Victor,W ilhiam Keith W/M W/M Edgfi Id 11 10/1/1988 Lif Inprisoni -t
1 reen,Anthon B/M W/F Cha leton 9 10/1/1988 Ex td
7 Bell,illiamHen ,Jr. B/M W/M Anderson 10 3/14/1989 Pndmg
73 M ..nig,ar D. B/M W/M Dillon 4 /15/1989 4/3/1995' Aquin
d
7 W-n,JamesWilia W/M 2B/ Gi nwood 8 591989mndmg
75 Sims, Mitchell W/M 2W/M Berkeley 5/13/1989 p ndmg
7 oung,.Ken ean B/M W/M Andron 10 5/22/1989 6/12/1993 Exnted
Drr, RonaldJohn 611141984 ife hnprisomp. nt
Longworth, Richard Sp--biiig 9/10/1991, -- d
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SouthCaoin ah Sentences Listoflho Sentencedto Death
1977-2015
Original Sentence
Defendan ctfin County of Circuit of Sentence Date After
Name t Race Race Cnvicion Cnviciun Uate Reversal FinalResult
W/M Spatmbug 9 /10 /19911
89 HalI,LarryEugene W/M 2W/F Pi kns 13 1/28/1992 Lif hnprisonn t
90 Suutherland, Rober W/M W/F Lxingon 11 3/9/1992 Life hprisomn it
91 Franklin Ellis B/M W/F Willi-msbug 3 122199 Lif mprisonment
92 Holmes lobb Lee B/M BF York 16 4/201993 3/28/2001 Life hoIpri-nn--t
93 aneRobertLee B/M W/F Elorn 12 6/25/1993 Life Imprisonmuent
9Hudins,Joseh W/M(16) W/M Anderson 7/27/1993 Lif hnIprisonmuent
9 Tucker Richard B/M W/F Sptmbug 7 10/28/1993 Life nrisonmnt
96W illias,Luke,lll W/M W/F EdgfieId 11 11/23/199 Exeutd
W/M
97 luker,JaesN. W/M W/F Clhon 1 12/8/1993 7/17/1996 Exentd(Su ntrCoty)
W/F S-tr 3 12/16/1994
98 G-eore,Riky B/M W/M Horry 15 1/20/1994 Life mprisonmunt
99cWee,Jer W/M W/M Aikn 2 1/23/1994 Exeutd
100 oners, Rober B/M 16 W/F Clan don 3 2/17/1994 Life Imprisom it
101 i I.leJames W/M W/F Horry 15 2/18/1994 Life Inpisonmunt
L0Rers,TimothyD. B/M W/F Dorc htr 1 5/1994 1211t1996 50YaSenten
103 Hlmphnes, Shawn W/M W/M Genville 13 8/9/1994 Exeutd
104 impson,KeithL B/M W/M Spatmbug 9/20/1994 Life Impriso -t
105 veyThomas B/M W/M Omngbg 1 1/201995 Exeutd
W/M Ormgebug 711711995
106 fram.Jason W/M W/F Rihlmd 3191995 Exetd
10 Kelly, Thedure B/M B/ Spatmbug 8/14/1995 Life Imprisom int
M
108 Hughes He.n B/M (17) W/M Clhoun 1 9/12/1995 Life mprisom it
109 Hughes, Mar-Ree B/M W/M York 169/22/1995 Pnding
SBennettJohnn B/M B/M Lxingon 11 1019199 7/16/2000 pedig
111 HiLavidClaton W/M W/M Gorgtown 15 101199 Exeutd
11 Gardner Juseph B/M W/F Dorl tr 112113199 Exeutd
11 Powers,Ied W/M(17) W/F xinton 11 223199 Lifnirisoimunt
114 Johnson,Rerale W/M W/F Clho 1 227199 DidonD athRow
115 Rueond, Andm B/M W/F Spatmbu 01996 Lif Imprisoi it
11 Ard,Joseph W/M W/ Lxington 11 4251996 RI sed
117 icks, Willia B/M W/M Aiken 4/30/1996 30 Y aSent
118 Reed,JaesEarl B/M B/F Ch lston 9 61911996 Exeuted
B/
ll9H insITis B/M W/M Horry 15 9/12/1996 Life hmpr-nnt
12 ounciIUonnie B/M W/F Aikn 210/23/1996 Pnding Rentning
L21 Stone, BobbyWae W/M W/M S tr 3 1/28/1997 2/27/2005 Pnding
122 Willias,Geor eAllen B/M B/F Lxington 11 2/7/1997 DidonD athRow
23 tanes, Nruan W/M W/M Lxington 11 4/25/1997 11/1712007 Pnding
12 r Ga W/M B/F Lxington 11 9/21/1997 Pending
12 HuheJohn B/M B/F Abbvill 810/30/1997 Pnding
126 haferesle W/M W/M Union 16 1/21/1998 Life hmpr-nnt
127 uattlebaum,RobertJoseph W/M W/M Lxington 11 3/4/1998 Life Imprismnt
128 Clure,Uavd,Jr. W/M W/M Banwel 4/29/1998 Lif hmpr-nnt
129 Aeksey,Bayan B/M B/M Omgbrg 1 9/1/1998 Pnding
3l Kell Willi-a W/M(17) W/M Lxingon 11 9/19/1998 LifIlrimnm nt
I Lucklair Jurn WmM WF Spatmbg 9/22/1998 Lif Imnrisnm it
I3 ones,JeffreyL B/M /F Lxington 11 11/10/1998 3/14,2007 Lif Iimlprisonmet
W/M
I ShlerCalvn B/M M Dorhstr 11/12/1998 Exeuted
2016]
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APPENDIX A'
South Caroina Death Sentences - Listof Those Sentenced to Death
1977-2015
Oiginal Sentence
Defendan Victim County of Circuit of Sentence Date After
Name t Race Race Conviction Conviction Date Reversal FinalResult
13 Owens,Freddie BM B/F Genville 13 2/17/1999 2/14/2003 Pndmg
11/11/2006
135 immons Kenneth B/M B/F Dorchester 3/2/1999 Pendmg
136 Robertson, Jaes W/M W/F York 16 3/26/1999 Pendmg
W/M
13 'eik, JohnEdward W/M W/F Dor r 1 5/29/1999 Pendmg
138 Stokes Same Lous B/M W/F Ormgeburg 1 10/31/1999 Pendmg
13 HillDavdMark W/M W/M Aiken 2212000 Exeured
W/F
B/F
140 Burkhart,IroyAlan W/M 2W/M Andron 10 3/18/2000 3/31/2004 Life hnpisoin
IWE
141 ench, Chstopherale W/M W/M Andron 10 5/8/2000 DiedonDel Row
14 assaro, Michael W/M W/F Horry 15 8/17/2000 Exeuted
143 WiseArthurHastings B/M IW/F Aikn 2 2/1/2001 Exeuted
144 Haselden,Jeffrey W/M W/M Lxington 11 2/132001 Lif Inpnsoun nt
145 Shuler, Charles W/M 3W/F Ongeburg 1 3/22/2001 DiedonDihRow
46 antJamesNathaniel B/M W/M Horry 15 6/25/2001 10/9/2004 Pedmg
14 Us, Denina W/M 2B/M Andron 101019/2001 Lif Inpnsonnurn
148 Laney,Michael W/M 21B/F Greville 13 10/19/2001 Lif Inpsoninln
149 Moore,RichardBernard B/M W/M Sparraburg 10/22/2001 Pendmg
150 WodJohnRichard W/M W/M Grenville 13 2/16/2002 Pendmg
151 BowmanManon B/M W/F Dorhestr 5/23/2002 Pendm
152 Downs,William,Jr. W/M W/M Aikn 2 6/27/2002 Exeured
15 Sigmon,BradKeith W/M W/M Genville 13 7/21/2002 Pendmg
W/F
15 Binne JohnathanKvle W/M W/F Cheroke 1 14/2002 Pedmg
155 Spa JesseWalon W/M W/M Berkely 9 /19200 Died on D hRow
156 Vasquez,AngelJoePierre BM WM Horry 15 10/5/2007 Lif Inpsonnlnt
B/M
15 oerts,TyreeAlfonso B/M W/M Beufor 14 10/22/2003 Pedmg
.ka: Abdiyyahben B/M
Alkehulan ahh
158 Northcutt, Clinton W/M W/F Lxington 11 11/14/2003 6/18/2009 Pendmg
159 MorganEncale W/M W/M Sparrlburg 3/9/2004 Lif Inpnsonnn
160 Lindse, Manon B/M W/F Sparrabrg 5/24/2004 Pedmg
161 Evans,KamellDelshawn B/M W/M Grenville 13 9/21/2004 Pedmg
W/M
162 Eins, Fredrck B/M W/F Sparraburg 11/19/2004 Lif Inpnson Int
163 Williams, Charles Chnstopher B/M W/F Grneville 13 2/19/2005 Pedmg
16 AlenQuincy B/M W/M Rihland 3/18/2005 Pedmg
B/F
165 Cottrel,LuzenskiAlen B/M W/M Horry 15 4/6/2005 9/27/2014 Pedmg
166 Meer, Kevin B/M B/M Lxington I 4/22/2006 P ing Rentning
167 Stako, Stephen W/M W/F Gorgown 15 8/18/2006 Pendmg
W/M Horry 15 11/19/2009
168 lahdi,MikalD. B/M W/M Clhoun 1 12/8/2006 Pendmg
169 Woods,Anthony B/M W/F Cl ndon 3 12/8/2006 Pendmg
170 Bixby, St-veVe-on reewood 92/21/2007
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APPENDIX A'
South CarolinaDeath Sentences -ListofThose SentencedtoDeath
1977-2015
Original Sentence
Defendan Victim County of Circuit of Sentence DateAfter
Name t Race Race tonction Conviction Date Reveral FinalResult
17 Bryant, Stephen C. W/M W/M Sumtf 3 9/11/2008 p uding
W/M
3/M
175 Trres,AndresAntonio H/M W/M Spatanburg 10/23/2008 pending
W/F
176 Istus, KennethH. W/M W/M Dot hest 1 12/23/2008 DidonDethRow
177 imanJerryBuck" W/M W/F Pikns 13 22200Pmding
178 Dikern,WiliaJr. B/M B/M Chi- eton 9 5/7/2009 peding
179iveIinondeze B/M B/F Anderson 10 2/18/2010 Life lmtnnmnt
18 BarnesSteven B/M B/M Edgfild 11 1117/2010 PndingRtrial
i81 Blakwell,RickyLee W/M IWF Sprtanburg 1612041 pding
* The information in Appendix A was obtained from the reports
completed by the trial judge in all cases in which a death sentence
was imposed as required by S.C. Code § 16-3-25(A). See also State
v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 219-42, 255 S.E.2d 799, 811-28 (1979)
(including a template of the report as Appendix B to the opinion).
Copies of the sentencing reports are on file with the authors.
LEGEND FOR APPENDIX A:
1 Tried in Chester County
2 Jury from Newberry County
3 Tried in Union County
4 Tried in Sumter County
5 Jury from Greenwood County
6 Tried in Berkeley County
7 Tried in Pickins County
" Tried in Kershaw
9 Jury from Lancaster County
10 Tried in Aiken County
" Jury from Florence County
12 Jury from York County
13 Jury from Aiken County
14 Jury from Chesterfield County
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TOTALS FOR APPENDIX A:
Race/Gender # %
Black defendants sentenced to death 86 47.51%
White defendants sentenced to death 93 51.38%
Hispanic defendants sentenced to death 1 0.55%
Native Americans sentenced to death 1 0.55%
Defendants sentenced to death for killing
black victims 33 17.65%
Defendants sentenced to death for killing
white victims 151 80.75%
Defendants sentenced to death for killing
Asian victims 3 1.60%
Black Defendants/White Victims 63 33.69%
Black Defendants/Black Victims 22 11.76%
Black Defendant/Asian Victim 2 1.07%
White Defendants/White Victims 86 45.99%
White Defendants/Black Victims 11 5.88%
White Defendant/Asian Victim 1 0.53%
Hispanic Defendant/White Victim 1 0.53%
Native American Defendant/White Victim 1 0.53%
Male defendants 180 99.45%
Female defendants 1 0.55%
Male Defendants/Female Victims 99 52.94%
Male Defendants/Male Victims 87 46.52%
Female Defendant/Male Victim 1 0.53
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APPENDIXB*
South Carolina's Current Death Row
(As of 12/31/2015)
Name Defendant Victi County Original Time on
Race mo Sentence Death Row
Race Date (years)
L Singleton, Fred B/M W/F Newberry 9/17/1983 3231
2 Jones, DonaldAllen B/M W/F Lancaster 2/8/1984 3192
3 Bell, William Henry, Jr. B/M W/M Anderson 3/14/1989 2682
4 Wilson, JamesWilliam W/M 2B/F Greenwood 5/9/1989 26 66
5 Sims, Mitchell W/M W/M Berkeley 5/13/1989 2665
6 Hughes, Mar-Reece B/M W/M York 9/22/1995 20 29
7 BennettJohnny B/M B/M Lexington 10/19/1995 20 21
8 CouncilDonnie BIM W/F Aiken 101231996 1920
9 Stone, BobbyWayne W/M W/M Sunter 1/28/1997 1893
10 Starnes,Norman W/M W/M Lexigon 4/25/1997 l&70
11 Terry,Gay W/M B/F Lexington 9/21/1997 1829
12 Hughey, JohnKennedy BIM 2BF Abbeville 101301997 1818
E Aleksey,Bayan B/M B/M Orangebu g 9/1/1998 1734
14 Owens, Freddie B/M B/F Greenville 2/17/1999 1688
_5 Simmons,Kenneth BIM B/F Dorchester 31211999 1684
16 Robertson, James W/M W/ York 3/27/1999 16 78
M
_7 Weik, JohnEdward W/M W/F Dorchester 612111999 1654
t8 Stokes, SammieLouis B/M W/F fOangebuog 10/31/1999 1618
19 Bryant, JamesNathaniel B/M W/M Horry 6/25/2001 1453
20 Moore, RichardBenard B/M W/M Spartanbrg 10/23/2001 1420
21 Wood, JohnRichard W/M W/M Greenville 2/16/2002 1388
22 Bowman, Marion,Jr. B/M W/F Dorciester 5/23/2002 13 62
23 Sigmon, BradKeith W/M W/ Greenville 7/21/2002 1345
M
24 Binnev, JohnathanKvle W/M W/F C herokee 1111412002 1314
25 Roberts, TyreeAlfonzo(akaAbdiyyah B/M W Beaufort 10/22/2003 1220
ben Alkebulanyahh) M
26 Northcutt, Clinton Robert W/M W/F Lexington 11/14/2003 1214
27 Lindsey,Marion B/M W/F Spartanburg 5/24/2004 1161
28 Evans, KamellDelshawn BIM 2 W/M Greenville 912112004 11 28
29 Williams, CharlesChristopher B/M W/F Greenville 2/18/2005 1087
30 Allen, Quincy B/M W/ Riclland 212005 1079
M
31 Cottrell, LuzenskiAllen B/M W/M Hony 462005 1074
32 Mercer, Kevin Jermaine BIM BIM Lexington 42006 970
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APPENDIXB'
South Carolina's Current Death Row
(As of 12/31/2015)
Name Defendant Victi County Original Time on
Race n Sentence Death Row
Race Date (years)
33 Stanko, Stephen W/M W/F Georgetown 8/18/2006 938
W/M Horry 11/19/2009
34 Mahdi, MikalD. B/M W/M Calhoun 12/8/2006 907
35 Woods,Anthony B/M W/F Clarendon 12/8/2006 907
36 Bixby, StevenVernon W/M W/ Greenwood 2/21/2007 886
M
37 Finklea, RonOneal B/M B/M Lexington 9/6/2007 832
]8 Winkler, LouisMichael W/M WF Horry 21812008 790
39 Bryant, StephenC. W/M 2W/M Slmter 9/11/2008 731
lB/M
40 TorresAndresAntonio H/M W/ Spartanborg 10/23/2008 719
M
41 InmanJerry"Buck" W/M W/F Pickens 4/22/2009 670
42 Dickerson, WilliamJr. B/M B/M Charleston 5/7/2009 665
43 Barnes, Steven BIM BIM Edgf Ield 1111712010 512
44 Blackwell, RickyLee W/M W/F pataburg 3/17/2014 179
* The information in Appendix B was obtained by comparing the
information in Appendix A, Appendix C, Appendix E, Appedix F and
information about relief granted in other proceedings maintained by
Justic 360 and the authors. Cases in italics indicate the individual has
been granted either guilt or penalty phase relief. These cases are either
pending retrial or resentencing or have been appealed by the State to a
higher court and the appeal remains pending.
TOTALS:
Race/Gender # %
Black Defendants 26 57.78%
White Defendants 18 40.00%
Hispanic Defendants 1 2.22%
Defendants sentenced to death for killing black victims 11 23.91%
Defendants sentenced to death for killing white victims 35 76.09%
Black Defendants/White Victims 17 36.96%
Black Defendants/BlackVictims 9 19.57%
White Defendants/White Victims 17 36.96%
White Defendants/BlackVictims 2 4.35%
Hispanic Defendant/White Victim 1 2.17%
Male defendants 45 100.00%
Female defendants 0 0.000
Male Defendants/FemaleVictims 24 52.17%
Male Defendants/Male Victims 22 47.83%
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APPENDIX C*
Souh C.arlina Ex-uion List f Thow Ex-utd
1976-2015
Name Deeda Victim County of Origi.a E utio Ti me.o Eecution Other
.t Race Race & cin Sentence Date Death Ro- Method
& Se Se Date ears)
I Sha-,Joph Carl W/M W/F Rihaid 12/16/1977 1/11/1985 708 El-ou
W/M
2 Roach, James Terry W/M W/F Rilad 12/16/1977 1/10/1986 807 Fl--our Juei
W/M
3 Woomer, Ronald W/M W/F H W  7/20/1979 4/27/1990 10 78 El--trour
4 Gaskins, Dona.IdHenry W/M B/M Rilad 3/26/1983 9/6/1991 845 Eliiou
5 dams, Syester B/M B/M Yir 3/3/1980 8/18/1995 1547 Lil IJcti Inlll
6 So.th, Robert W/M W/M L igi 11/17/1983 5/31/1996 12 55 Lil lIiour Vouiee
7 orahres, Fred W/M W/F Chal ii 11/19/1985 7/19/1996 1067 LillIeiour
2W/MII
8 Torrene, Michael W/M W/M Lingi 5/28/1988 9/6/1996 828 Let l Injur Vonteri
9 Beli, Larry Gene W/M W/F Salda 2/27/1986 10/4/1996 1061 lt-ou Crpiny 7
10 L-cas, Doyle Cil W/M W/ Y r 7/27/1983 11/15/1996 13 32 Lill Injci Vor
W/M
l IlMiddeton, Frank B/M B/F Clhrn 2/4/1985 11/22/1996 1181 Lil I Inelci
1yD-bhld
12 ilk.s, Michae W/M W/F Jsp 3/30/1991 6/13/1997 6 21 lil InJct Vor
13 latthes, Earl B/M WE Chaile 5/13/1985 11/7/1997 12 50 lilli Inecti
A r.oId, John W/M B/F Bafr 2/9/1979 3/6/1998 1908 Lihl InJeion
15 Plath, John W/M B/F Bafr 2/9/1979 7/10/1998 1943 Lil InJeion
16 Rtberts, Sammy Daid W/M 2W/M Bite 1/19/1981 9/25/1998 1769 Lihld InJeion
B/M
17 eato, J.D. B/M W/M Lexingi 10/7/1977 12/4/1998 21 17 Lihl InJeion
18 Gilbert, Larry B/M W/M Lexingi 10/7/1977 12/4/1998 21 17 Lill InJein Eid- f
Disbility
19 1 esdale, Lois B/M W/F Larar 12111980 1111998 1801 Lil Ijeion
20 ISmith,Andy Laern BM BF Andsn 1/71984 1/18/1998 14 93 LiIl InJeion
B/M
21 Ho.ard, Ro..ie B/M iaF Geille 6/15/1986 1/8/1999 12 8 Lil IJe i
22 Atk.s, Joeph NAM B/F Chaleso 6/28/1986 1/22/1999 12 58 Lihll Injecii
W/M
23 Drayto, Leroy B/M W/F Chales 10/8/1984 11/12/1999 15 10 Lil Injc
24 Rochille, David W/M W/M Sparanbg 7/15/1991 12/3/1999 8 39 Lil InJeion
25 Young, in Dean B/M W/M Andn 5/22/1989 11/3/2000 1146 Ltil InJct
26 Johno, Richard W/M B/M Jaspe 2/15/1986 5/3/2002 16 22 Lil Injeion
27 Gr- , Anthony B/M W/F Chaleso 10/1/1988 8/23/2002 13 90 Lihll Injecii
28 assaro, Mchae W/M W/F Hnry 8/17/2000 9/13/2002 0 i7 hl Injeion Voi
29 Hill, Daid Cayto W/M W/M orgion 10/31/1995 3/19/2004 8 39 lill Inei
3 cWE, Jerry W/M W/M Aikn 1/23/1994 4/16/2004 10 24 lill Inei
31 yram, Jaso W/M W/F Richland 3/9/1995 4/23/2004 9 13 lillI Inecti
32 tcker, James N. WM W/F 12/8/199 5/28/2004 1048 ecI toun
33 ogorth, Richard WM 2 W/M Sparanbg 9/10/1991 4/15/2005 13 61 Lil Injeion
34 ie,Arthur Hast.igs B/M I W/F Aikn 2/1/2001 11/4/2005 4 76 Lil Inectio Vo r
3 W/M
35 H.mphries, Shawn W/M W/M Genvll 8/9/1994 12/2/2005 1132 Lill Injeio
36 Po.wns, William, Jr W/M B/M Aikn 6/27/2002 7/14/2006 405 Lil InJeion Vo r
7 hler, CalinAlphos BM W/M Drhes 11/1998 6/22/2007 861 Lil InJeion
8 ill, Daid Mark W/M W/M ik 14/2000 6/6/2008 8 32 Lil Inectio Vor
WIF
B/F
39 R d,JamesEar B/M B/M Chafls 6/9/1996 6/20/2008 1204 etcoui Vo r
40 ardner, Joph B/M W/F Do.hi i 12/13/1995 12/5/2008 12 99 illI Injcti
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APPENDIX C*
Souh Ca...li.. Ex-uion List f Thow Ex-utd
1976-2015
Name Defendant Victim Co.ty of Original Exti Ti .meo. Exuetion Other
Race & Rac & ....... Sete Dae .. Dth R-.' Method
Se Se Dae Gears)
41 Wii-ams, L.ke, III W/M W/F gfied 11/23/1993 2/20/2009 15 L25 hL l IjU
W/M
42 hey, Thomas B/M W/M ngbug 1/20/1995 5/8/2009 14 31 Lhal IJctio
W/M
4 Motts,Jeey Bria WM WM Greille 1242007 562011 3 42 Lethal IrJet Vunte
* The information in Appendix C has been systematically maintained by Justice 360 and the
authors since the first modem South Carolina execution in 1985. Itwas confirmed by a similar list
maintained by the Death Penalty Information Center (www.deathpenaltvinfo.org).
TOTALS:
Race/Gender # %
BlackDefendants 16 37.21%
White Defendants 26 60.47%
Native AmericanDefendants 1 2 .3 30%
Defendants sentenced to death for killing black victims 10 23.26%
Defendants sentenced to death for killing white victims 32 74.42%
Defendants sentenced to death for killing Asian victims 1 2.330%
Black Defendants/White Victims 11 2 5 .5 8 %
Black Defendants/Black Victims 4 9.30%
Black Defendant/Asian Victim 1 2.330%
White Defendants/White Victim s 20 46.51%
White Defendants/Black Victims 6 13 .9 5 %
Native American DefendantWhite Victim 1 2.330%
Male defendants 43 100.00%
Female defendants 0 0.00%
Male Defendants/Female Victims 25 58.1400
Male Defendants/Male Victim s 18 4
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APPENDIX D
South Carolina Death Srnences
(Listed by Aggravating
Circumstances) 1977-2015
Senen'
Name ce v Total
Date
Tucker, Richard 10/28/199 x x x x 4
Tyner, Rudolph 811/1978 x 1
Tyner, Rudolph 10/11/198 x 1
Vasquez, Angel Joe Pierre 10/5/2003 x x x 3
Victor, William Keith 10/1/1988 x 1
Von Dolien, Herman 5/28/1991 x 1
Weik, John Edward 5/29/1999 x x 2
Weldon, Dana 6/15/1986 x x 2
West, Floyd 10/21/198 x 1
Whipple, James 2/18/1994 x x 2
Williams, Charles 2/19/2005 x 1
Williams, George Allen 2/7/1997 x x 2
Williams, Luke, III 11/23/199 x x 2
Wilson, James William 51911989 x x 2
Winkler, Louis Michael 2/7/2008 x x 2
Wise, Arthur Hastings 2/1/2001 x x 2
Wood, John Richard 2/16/2002 x 1
Woods,Anthony 12/8/2006 x x 2
Woods, Stanley Eugene 1983 x x 2
Woomer, Ronald (Holy) 7/20/1979 x x 2
Woomer, Ronald (Colleton) 6/7/1981 x InD x 2
Woomer, Ronald (Holy) 7/23/1981 x x 2
Yates, Dale Roberts 5/2/1981 x 1
Young, Kevin Dean 5/22/1989
Total Per Aggravating 4 3 7 0 4 11 4 9 1 0 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 0 3 1 1 0
Total Number of Single Agg. Cases: 83
Average Number of Aggs. Per Case: 205
* The information in Appendix D was obtained from the reports completed by the trial
judge in all cases in which a death sentence was imposed as required by S.C. Code §
16-3-25(A). See also State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 219-42, 255 S.E.2d 799, 811-28
(1979) (including a template of the report as Appendix B to the opinion). Copies of the
sentencing reports are on file with the authors.
** Aggravating circumstances removed from earlier version of the S.C. Code § 16-3-
20.
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State v. Gill, 273 S.C. 190, 255 S.E.2d 455 (1979) Reversed-NT'
State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 957 Affirmed'
(1979)
2
State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 258 S.E.2d 559 (1979) ReversedS4
State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979)' Reversed-S
State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E.2d 31 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. Reversed-S
1037 (1980)
State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981) Reversed-S
State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981) Reversed-NT
State v. Hyman 276 S.C. 559, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. Aifrned
1122 (1982)
State v. Gilbert, 277 S.C. 53, 283 S.E.2d 179 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 Aifrned
(1982)6
State v. Adams, 277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981) Reversed-NT
State v. Plath, 277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981)' Reversed-S
State v. Woomer, 277 S.C. 170, 284 S.E.2d 357 (1981) Reversed-NT
State v. (James) Butler, 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E.2d 420 (1982) Reversed-NT
State v. Thompson, 278 S.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 581 (1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. Aifrned
938 (1982)
State v. (Wardell) Patterson, 278 S.C. 319, 295 S.E.2d 264 (1982) Reversed-NT
State v. Truesdale, 278 S.C. 368, 296 S.E.2d 528 (1982) Reversed-NT
State v. (Horace) Butler, 277 S.C. 452, 290 S.E.2d 1 (1982), cert denied, 459 Aifrned
U.S. 932 (1982)
State v. Sloan, 278 S.C. 435, 298 S.E.2d 92 (1982) Reversed-NT
State v. Woomer,278 S.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d317 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. Aifrned
1229 (1983)
State v. Smart, 278 S.C. 515,299 S.E.2d 686 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1088 Reversed-S
(1983)
State v. Koon, 278 S.C. 528, 298 S.E.2d 769 (1982) Reversed-S
State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. Aifrned
1103 (1983)8
State v. Adams 279 S.C. 228, 306 S.E.2d 208 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. Aifrned
1023 (1983)
State v. Spann 279 S.C. 399, 308 S.E.2d 518 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 947 Aifrned
(1984)
State v. Elmore, 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781 (1983) Reversed-NT
State v. Plath, 281 S.C. 1, 313 S.E.2d 619 (1984) 9  Aifrned
Statev. Yates, 280 S.C. 29, 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124 Affirmed
(1983)
State v. (Stanley) Woods, 282 S.C. 18, 316 S.E.2d 673 (1984) Reversed-NT
State v. Stewart, 283 S.C. 104, 320 S.E.2d 447 (1984) Reversed-S
State v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 105, 326 S.E.2d 132 (1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. Affirmed
1120 (1985)
State v. Singleton, 284 S.C. 388, 326 S.E.2d 153 (1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. Affirmed
1111 (1985)
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State v. Koon , 285 S.C. 1, 328 S.E.2d 625 (1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1036 Affirmed
(1985)
State v. (Wardell) Patterson, 285 S.C. 5,327 S.E.2d 650 (1984), cert. denied, Affirmed
471 U.S. 1036 (1985)
State v. Truesdale, 285 S.C. 13, 328 S.E.2d 53 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. Affirmed
1009 (1985)
State v. Chaffee, 285 S.C. 21, 328 S.E.2d 464 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009 Affirmed
(1985)"
State v. Lucas, 285 S.C. 37, 328 S.E.2d 63 (1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012 Affirmed
(1985)
State v. Skipper, 285 S.C. 42, 328 S.E.2d 58 (1985), rev'd, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) Affirmed
State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985) Reversed-S
State v. Damon, 285 S.C. 125, 328 S.E.2d 628 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 Affirmed
(1985)
State v. South , 285 S.C. 529, 331S.E.2d 775 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 888 Affirmed
(1985)
State v. Elmore, 286 S.C. 70, 332 S.E.2d 762 (1985), rev'd in part and remanded, Affirmed
476 U.S. 1101 (1986) (per curiam)
State v. Plemmons, 286 S.C. 78, 332 S.E.2d 765 (1985), rev'd in part and Affirmed
remanded, 476 U.S. 1102 (1986) (per curiam)
State v. (AndrewLavern) Smith, 286 S.C. 406, 334 S.E.2d 277 (1985), cert. Affirmed
denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986)
State v. Drayton, 287 S.C. 226, 337 S.E.2d 216 (1985) Reversed-NT
State v. Peterson, 287 S.C. 244, 335 S.E.2d 800 (1985)" Reversed-NT
State v. (Donald) Jones, 288 S.C. 1, 340 S.E.2d 782 (1985), rev'don other Affirmed
grounds, 479 U.S. 102 (1986) (per curiam)
State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986) Reversed-NT
State v. Stewart, 288 S.C. 232, 361 S.E.2d 789 (1986) Reversed-S
State v. Patrick, 289 S.C. 301, 345 S.E.2d 481 (1986) Reversed-S
State v. Pierce, 289 S.C. 430, 346 S.E.2d 707 (1986) Reversed-NT
State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 347 S.E.2d 882 (1986) Reversed-NT
State v. Kornahrens, 290 S.C. 281, 350 S.E.2d 180 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. Affirmed
940 (1987)
State v. Arthur, 290 S.C. 291, 350 S.E.2d 187 (1986) Reversed-S
State v. (Raymond) Patterson, 290 S.C. 523, 351 S.E.2d 853 (1986), cert. denied, Reversed-S
482 U.S. 902 (1987)
State v. Riddle, 291 S.C. 232, 353 S.E.2d 138 (1987) Reversed-S
State v. (Kamathene) Cooper, 291 S.C. 332, 353 S.E.2d 441 (1986) Reversed-NT
State v. Matthews, 291 S.C. 339, 353 S.E.2d 444 (1986) Reversed-S
State v. Hawkins, 292 S.C. 418, 357 S.E.2d 10 (1987) Reversed-NT
State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E.2d 63 (1987) Reversed-NT
State v. (Alvin) Owens, 293 S.C. 161, 359 S.E.2d 275 (1987), cert. denied, 484 Affirmed
U.S. 982 (1987)
State v. Atkins, 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987) Reversed-S
State v. (Richard) Johnson, 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d 317 (1987) Reversed-NT
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State v. (Larry) Bell, 293 S.C. 391, 360 S.E.2d 706 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. Affirmed
1020 (1988)
State v. Drayton, 293 S.C. 417, 361 S.E.2d 329 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. Affirmed
1079 (1988)
State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515,362 S.E.2d 13 (1987) Reversed-S
State v. Cockerham, 294 S.C. 380, 365 S.E.2d 22 (1988) Reversed-NT
State v. Middleton , 295 S.C. 318, 368 S.E.2d 457 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. Aifrned
872 (1988)
State v. Howard, 295 S.C. 462, 369 S.E.2d 132 (1988), cert denied, 490U.S. Reversed-S/Aifrmned
1113 (1989)
12
State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. 476, 369 S.E.2d 140 (1988), affd, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) Reversed-S
State v. Plemmons, 296 S.C. 76, 370 S.E.2d 871 (1988) Revesed-S
State v. Brown , 296 S.C. 191, 371 S.E.2d 523 (1988) Reversed-NT
State v. Diddlemeyer, 296 S.C. 235, 371 S.E.2d 793 (1988) Reversed-NT
State v. Matthews, 296 S.C. 379, 373 S.E.2d 587 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. Aifrned
1091 (1989)
State v. Arthur, 296 S.C. 495, 374 S.E.2d 291 (1988) Reversed-S
State v. Cain, 297 S.C. 497, 377 S.E.2d 556 (1988), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1010 Aifrned
(1990)
State v. (Donald) Jones ,298 S.C. 118, 378 S.E.2d 594 (1989), cert. denied, 494 Aifrned
U.S. 1060 (1990)
State v. (AndrewLavern) Smith, 298 S.C. 482, 381 S.E.2d 724 (1989), cert. Affirned
denied, 494 U.S. 1060 (1990)
State v. (Raymond) Patterson, 299 S.C. 280, 384 S.E.2d 699 (1989), vacated, Aifrned
493 U.S. 1013 (1991)
State v. Elmore, 300 S.C. 130, 386 S.E.2d 769 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 Aifrned
(1990)
State v. Victor 300 S.C. 220, 387 S.E.2d 248 (1989) Reversed-NT
State v. Caldwell, 300 S.C. 494, 388 S.E.2d 816 (1990) Reversed-S
State v. Riddle, 301 S.C. 68, 389 S.E.2d 665 (1990) Reversed-S
State v. Truesdale ,301 S.C. 347, 393 S.E.2d 168 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. Aifrned
1074 (1990)
State v. Green 301 S.C. 347, 392 S.E.2d 157 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 Aifrned
(1990)
State v. (Larry) Bell ,302 S.C. 18, 393 S.E.2d 364 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. Aifrned
881 (1990)
State v. (Raymond) Patterson, 302 S.C. 384, 396 S.E.2d 366 (1990), vacated, Aifrned
500 U.S. 950 (1991)
State v. Atkins, 303 S.C. 214, 399 S.E.2d 760 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 Aifrned
(1991)
State v. Orr, 304 304 S.C. 185, 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991) Reversed-NT
Statev. Sims,304 S.C. 409, 405 S.E.2d377 (1991),cert. denied, 502U.S. 1103 Aifrned
(1992)
State v. (William) Bell, 305 S.C. 11, 406 S.E.2d 165 (1991), cert. denied, 502 Aifrned
U.S. 1038 (1992)
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State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) Reversed-S
State v. Young, 305 S.C. 380, 409 S.E.2d 352 (1991) Reversed-S
State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 409 S.E.2d 372 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. Reversed-NT
914 (1992)
State v. (Richard) Johnson 306 S.C. 119, 410 S.E.2d 547 (1991), cert. denied, Affirmed
503 U.S. 993 (1992)
State v. (WilhertRay) Davis, 306 S.C. 246, 411 S.E.2d 200 (1991) Reversed-NT
State v. Wilson 306 S.C. 498, 413 S.E.2d 19 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 846 Affirmed
(1992)
State v. (Tommy Lee) Davis, 309 S.C. 326, 422 S.E.2d 133 (1992), cert. denied, Affirmed
508 U.S. 915 (1993)
State v. (Rebecca) Smith, 309 S.C. 442, 424 S.E.2d 496 (1992) Reversed-NT
State v. Rocheville, 310 S.C. 20, 425 S.E.2d 32 (1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. Affirmed
978 (1993)
State v. Ray 310 S.C. 431, 427 S.E.2d 171 (1993) Reversed-S
State v. (Jonathan) Simmons, 310 S.C. 439, 427 S.E.2d 175 (1993), rev'd, 512 Affirmed
U.S. (1994)
State v. (Gene Tony) Cooper, 312 S.C. 90, 439 S.E.2d 276 (1994) Reversed-NT
Statev. Hall,312 S.C. 95,439 S.E.2d278 (1994), cert. denied,512U.S. 1246 Affirmed
(1994)
State v. Elkins, 312 S.C. 541, 436 S.E.2d 178 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1063 Affirmed
(1994)
State v. Charping, 313 S.C. 147, 437 S.E.2d 88 (1993) Reversed-NT
State v. Longworth 313 S.C. 360, 438 S.E.2d 219 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. Affirmed
831 (1994)
State v. Riddle, 314 S.C. 1, 443 S.E.2d 557 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1003 Affirmed
(1994)
State v. Southerland, 316 S.C. 377, 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994), cert. denied, 513 Affirmed
U.S. 1166 (1995)
State v. Franklin 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 856 Affirmed
(1995)
State v. Young,319 S.C. 33, 459 S.E.2d 84 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1051 Affirmed
(1996)
State v. Hudgins ,319 S.C. 233, 460 S.E.2d 388 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. Affirmed
1096 (1996)
State v. (Richard) Tucker 319 S.C. 425, 462 S.E.2 263 (1995), cert. denied, 516 Affirmed
U.S. 1080 (1996)
State v. (James) Tucker, 320 S.C. 206, 464 S.E.2d 105 (1995) Reversed-S
State v. Holmes, 320 S.C. 259, 464 S.E.2d 334 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. Affirmed
1248 (1996)
State v. Nance, 320 S.C. 501, 466 S.E.2d 349 (1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1026 Affirmed
State v. Rogers 320 S.C. 520, 466 S.E.2d 360 (1996) Reversed-S
State v. (Luke) Williams, 321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626 (1996), cert. denied, 519 Affirmed
U.S. 891 (1996) 1
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State v. Van Dohlen, 322 S.C. 234, 471 S.E.2d 689 (1996), cert. denied, 519U.S. Affirmed
972 (1996)
State v. McWee,322 S.C. 387, 472 S.E.2d235 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. Affirmed
1061 (1997)
State v. Torrence, 322 S.C. 475, 473 S.E.2d 703 (1996) Affirmed
State v. George 323 S.C. 496, 476 S.E.2d 903 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. Affirmed
1123 (1997)
State v. (Raymond) Patterson 324 S.C. 5, 482 S.E.2d 760 (1997), cert. denied, Affirmed
522 U.S. 853 (1997)
State v. Whipple ,324 S.C. 43, 476 S.E.2d260 (1996), cert. denied, 519U.S. Affirmed
1045 (1996)
State v. (James) Tucker, 324 S.C. 43, 478 S.E.2d 260 (1996), cert. denied, 520 Affirmed
U.S. 1200 (1997)
State v. Humphries 325 S.C. 28, 479 S.E.2d 57 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. Affirmed
1268 (1997)
State v. Simpson 325 S.C. 37, 479 S.E.2d 57 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1277 Affirmed
(1997)
State v. Ivey ,325 S.C. 137, 481 S.E.2d 125 (1997) Affirmed
State v. Byram, 326 S.C. 107, 485 S.E.2d 360 (1997) Affirmed
State v. Conyers 326 S.C. 263, 487 S.E.2d 181 (1997) Affirmed
State v. (Herman) Hughes, 328 S.C. 146, 493 S.E.2d 821 (1997), cert. denied, Affirmed
523 U.S. 1097 (1998)
State v. Bennett, 328 S.C. 251, 493 S.E.2d 845 (1997) Reversed-S
State v. Manning, 329 S.C. 1, 495 S.E.2d 191 (1997) Reversed-NT
Ray v. State 330 S.C. 184, 498 S.E.2d 640 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 905 Affirmed
(1998) (per curiam)
State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1022 Affirmed
(1998)
State v. Powers, 331 S.C. 37, 501 S.E.2d 116 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1043 Affirmed
(1998)
State v. (David Clayton) Hill, 331 S.C. 94, 501 S.E.2d 122 (1998), cert. denied, Affirmed
525 U.S. 1043 (1998)
State v. Ivey 331 S.C. 118, 502 S.E.2d 92 (1998), cert. denied, 1075 U.S. 1075 Affirmed
(1999)
State v. (Theodore) Kelly , 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998), cert. denied, 525 Affirmed
U.S. 1077 (1999)
State v. George 331 S.C. 342, 503 S.E.2d 168 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. Affirmed
1149 (1999)
Statev. Reed,332 S.C. 35, 503 S.E.2d747 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S 1150 Affirmed
(1999)
State v. Ard, 332 S.C. 370, 505 S.E.2d 328 (1998) Affirmed
State v. Gardner, 332 S.C. 389, 505 S.E.2d 338 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. Affirmed
1022 (1999) (per curiam)
State v. Charping, 333 S.C. 124, 508 S.E.2d 851 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. Affirmed
1007 (1999)
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State v. (James) Tucker, 334 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999), cert. denied, 527 Affirmed
U.S. 1042 (1999)
State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 803 Affirmed
(1999)
State v. Rosemond, 335 S.C. 593,518 S.E.2d 588 (1999) Affirmed
State v. Huggins, 336 S.C. 200, 519 S.E.2d 57 4 (1999) (per cuiam), cert. denied, Affirmed
528 U.S. 1172 (2000)
State v. (Mar-Reece) Hughes, 336 S.C. 585, 521 S.E.2d 500 (1999), cert. denied, Affirmed
529 U.S. 1025 (2000)
State v. (Roger) Johnson 338 S.C. 114, 525 S.E.2d 519 (2000), cert. denied, 531 Affirmed
U.S. 840 (2000)
State v. Rogers, 338 S.C. 435, 527 S.E.2d 101 (2000) Affirmed
State v. Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 527 S.E.2d 105 (2000) Reversed-NT
State v. Terry , 339 S.C. 352, 529 S.E.2d 274 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 882 Affirmed
(2000)
State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 529 S.E.2d 524 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 946 Affirmed
(2000)
State v. Shafer,340 S.C. 291, 531 S.E.2d524(2000), rev'd, 532 U.S. 36(2001) Affirmed
State v. Starnes, 340 S.C. 312, 531 S.E.2d 907 (2000) Reversed-NT
State v. Locklair 341 S.C. 352, 535 S.E.2d 420 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. Affirmed
1093 (2000)
State v. McClure 340 S.C. 403, 537 S.E.2d 273 (2000) Reversed-S
State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1027 Affirmed
(2001)
State v. (William) Kelly 343 S.C. 350, 540 S.E.2d 851 (2001), rev'd, 534 U.S. Affirmed
246 (2002)
State v. (Jeffrey) Jones, 343 S.C. 562, 541 S.E.2d 813 (2001) Reversed-NT
State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 545 S.E.2d 805 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 997 Affirmed
(2001)
State v. Stokes, 345 S.C. 368, 548 S.E.2d 202 (2001) Affirmed
State v. (Freddie) Owens, 346 S.C. 637, 552 S.E.2d 745 (2001) Reversed-S
State v. Burkhart, 350 S.C. 252, 565 S.E.2d 298 (2002) Reversed-NT
State v. Stone, 350 S.C. 442, 567 S.E.2d 244 (2002) Reversed-S
State v. Passaro , 350 S.C. 499, 567 S.E.2d 862 (2002) Affirmed
State v. Weik , 356 S.C. 76, 587 S.E.2d 683 (2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 930 Affirmed
(2003)
State v. Shafer, 352 S.C. 191,573 S.E.2d 796 (2002)1 Reversed-S
State v. Shuler, 353 S.C. 176,577 S.E.2d 438 (2003) Affirmed
State v. Haselden 353 S.C. 190, 577 S.E.2d 445 (2003) Reversed-S
State v. Tench 353 S.C. 531,579 S.E.2d 314 (2003) Affirmed
State v. (James Nethaniel) Bryant, 354 S.C. 390, 581 S.E.2d 157 (2003) Reversed-NT
State v. Moore, 357 S.C. 458, 593 S.E.2d 608 (2004) Affirmed
State v. Wise ,359 S.C. 14, 596 S.E.2d475 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 948 Affirmed
(2004)
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State v. (Kenneth) Simmons 360 S.C. 33, 599 S.E.2d 448 (2004), cert. denied, Affirmed
543 U.S. 1124 (2005)
State v. Downs 361 S.C. 141, 604 S.E.2d 377 (2004) Affirmed
State v. (David Mark) Hill, 361 S.C. 297, 604 S.E.2d 696 (2004), cert. denied, Affirmed
544 U.S. 1020 (2005)
State v. Holmes, 361 S.C. 333,605 S.E.2d 19 (2004), revd, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) Affirmed
State v. Wood, 362 S.C. 135,607 S.E.2d 57 (2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1132 Affirmed
(2005)
State v. (Freddie) Owens, 362 S.C. 175, 607 S.E.2d 78 (2004) Reversed-S
State v. Binney 362 S.C. 353, 608 S.E.2d 418 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S 852 Affirmed
(2005)
State v. Crisp, 362 S.C. 412, 608 S.E.2d 429 (2005) Reversed-NT
State v. Vazquez, 364 S.C. 293, 613 S.E.2d 359 (2005) Affirmed
State v. Sapp ,366 S.C. 283, 621 S.E.2d 883 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1133 Affirmed
(2006)
State v. Bowman 366 S.C. 485, 623 S.E.2d 378 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. Affirmed
1195 (2006)
State v. Sigmon, 366 S.C. 552, 623 S.E.2d 648 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 909 Affirmed
(2006)
State v. Morgan 367 S.C. 615,626 S.E.2d 888 (2006) Vacated-Roper 14
State v. Laney 367 S.C. 639, 627 S.E.2d 726 (2006) Reversed-S
State v. Bennett 369 S.C. 219, 632 S.E.2d 281 (2006), cert. denied, 549U.S. Affirmed
1061 (2006)
State v. Roberts, 369 S.C. 580, 632 S.E.2d 871 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. Affirmed
1279 (2007)
State v. Evans, 371 S.C. 27, 637 S.E.2d 313 (2006) Affirmed
State v. Burkhart, 371 S.C. 482, 640 S.E.2d 450 (2007) Reversed-S
State v. Lindsey, 372 S.C. 185, 642 S.E.2d 557 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 917 Affirmed
(2007)
State v. Northeutt, 372 S.C. 207, 641 S.E.2d 873 (2007) Reversed-S
State v. (James Nethaniel) Bryant, 372 S.C. 305, 642 S.E.2d 582 (2007), cert. Affirmed
denied, 552 U.S. 899 (2007)
State v. Evins, 373 S.C. 404, 645 S.E.2d 904 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S 1046 Affirmed
(2007)
State v. Stone, 376 S.C. 32, 655 S.E.2d 487 (2007) Affirmed
State v. Cottrell, 376 S.C. 260, 657 S.E.2d 451 (2008) Reversed-NT
State v. Stanko, 376 S.C. 571, 658 S.E.2d 94 (2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 785 Affirmed
(2008)
State v. (Freddie) Owens, 378 S.C. 636, 664 S.E.2d 80 (2008), cert. denied, 555 Affirmed
U.S. 1141 (2009)
State v. Mercer 381 S.C. 149, 672 S.E.2d 556 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 843 Affirmed
(2009)
State v. Woods 382 S.C. 153,676 S.E.2d 128 (2009) Affirmed
Mahdi v. State, 383 S.C. 135, 678 S.E.2d 807 (2009) Affirmed
State v. (Jeffrey) Jones, 383 S.C. 535, 681 S.E.2d 580 (2009) Reversed-NT
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APPENDIX E*
South Carolina Capital Direct Appeal Cases
1977-2015
Case Name Result
State v. (Quincy) Allen, 386 S.C. 93, 687 S.E.2d 21 (2009), cert. denied, 560 Affirmed
U.S. 929 (2010)
State v. (Charles Christopher) Williams, 386 S.C. 503, 690 S.E.2d 62 (2010), Affirmed
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 230 (2010)
State v. Flinklea, 388 S.C. 379, 697 S.E.2d 543 (2010) Affirmed
State v. Bixby 388 S.C. 528, 698 S.E.2d 572 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. Affirmed
2154 (2011)
State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 698 S.E.2d 596 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. Affirmed
2155 (2011)
State v. Starnes 388 S.C. 590, 698 S.E.2d 604 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. Affirmed
1504 (2011)
State v. Torres, 390 S.C. 618, 703 S.E.2d 226 (2010) Affirmed
State v. (Stephen) Bryant, 390 S.C. 638, 704 S.E.2d 344 (2011) Affirmed
State v. Justus 392 S.C. 416, 706 S.E.2d 668 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. Affirmed
1095 (2012)
State v. Dickerson 395 S.C. 101, 716 S.E.2d 895 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. Affirmed
1972(2012)
State v. Inman ,395 S.C. 539, 720 S.E.2d 31 (2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 219 Affirmed
(2012)
State v. Rivera 402 S.C. 225, 741 S.E.2d 694 (2013) Reversed-NT
State v. Stanko 402 S.C. 252, 741 S.E.2d 708 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. Affirmed
247 (2013)
State v. Barnes 407 S.C. 27, 753 S.E.2d 545 (2014) Reversed-NT
* The information in Appendix E was obtained from the Justice 360,
which has systematically maintained a list of all capital cases decided
by the South Carolina Supreme Court. It was confirmed by the authors'
independent legal research.
'Reversed-NT" means the South Carolina Supreme Court found the error in the guilt-or innocence phase
of the proceedings and ordered an entirely new trial.
2 This affirmed the death sentence of two defendants.
"Affirmed" means the South Carolina Supreme Court found no reversible error in the case.
4 "Reversed-S" means the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction(s) but
vacated the death sentence and ordered a new sentencing proceeding.
5 This reversed the death sentence of two defendants.
6 This affirmed the death sentence of two defendants.
7 This reversed the death sentence of two defendants.
8 This affirmed the death sentence of two defendants.
9 This affirmed the death sentence of two defendants.
lM This affinned the death sentence of two defendants.
11 This reversed the death sentence of two defendants.
12 One of the defendants was affirmed and one was given a new sentencing hearing.
13 Case decided on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.
14 Sentence vacated underRoper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting execution of juveniles).
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APPENDIX F*
Types of Error Detected in
South Carolina Death Cases
1977-2014
Newl Evidece
Prosecutorial Misconduct 16 3 19
Instructional Error 15 3 3 13
Evidentiary Error 19 4 34
Juror Qualification or 3 2
Other 11 15
Inadequate Assistance of 1 1
Nrew EvidenceI
ProseuorinalMisconduct
Instructional Error in A F 1
Evidentially Error18 4 9 34
Juror Qualification or33
Other111
Inladequate Assistance of199
Proportionality
* The information in Appendix F was obtained from the authors' review of the decisions listed
in Appendix E, Appendix G, research for decisions reported in Westlaw at other levels of the
appellate process, and the authors' tracking of unpublished opinions granting relief.
THE DEATH PENALTY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
APPENDIX G*
Post-Conviction Relief Reversals in South Carolina Courts
1977-2015
Thompson v. Aiken 281 S.C. 239, 240, 315 S.E.2d 110, 110 (1984)
Chaffee v. State, 294 S.C. 88, 91, 362 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1987)'
Damon v. Aiken 86-CP-38-211 (S.C. 1st Cir. C.P. June 22,1987)
Smith v. Aiken 86-CP-04-995 (S.C. 10th Cir. C.P. June 26, 1987)
Owens v. McKellar, 88-CP-26-605 (S.C. 15th Cir. C.P. Apr. 5,1988)
Cain v. Evalt, No. 90-CP-13-382 (S.C. 4th Cir. C.P. May 4,1995)
Whipple v. Moore, No. 97-CP-26-417 (S.C. 15th Cir. C.P. Dec. 10, 1998)
Holmes v. Moore, No. 96-CP-46-966 (S.C. 16th Cir. C.P. Jan. 15, 1998)
Southerland v. State, 337 S.C. 610, 617, 524 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1999)
Hudgins v. Moore, 337 S.C. 333, 339, 524 S.E.2d 105, 108 (1999)
Patterson v. State, No. 98-CP-32-0097 (S.C. llth Cir. C.P. Sept. 23, 1999)
Ray v. State, (S.C. 7th Cir. C.P. May 30, 2001)
Kelly v. State, No. 99-CP-42-1174 (Oct. 6,2003)
Hall v. Catoe, 360 S.C. 353, 365, 601 S.E.2d 335, 342 (2004)
Von Dohlen v. State, 360 S.C. 598, 614, 602 S.E.2d 738, 746 (2004)
Charping v. State, No. 99-CP-32-2316 (S.C. llth Cir. C.P. Sept. 3,2004);
Huggins v. State, No. 00-CP-26-1446 (S.C. 15th Cir. C.P. July 18, 2005)
Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 47-48, 631 S.E.2d 70, 75 (2006)
Simpson v. Moore, 367 S.C. 587, 608, 627 S.E.2d 701, 712 (2006)
Nance v. Ozmint, 367 S.C. 547, 558, 626 S.E.2d 878, 883 (2006)
Locklair v. State, No. 01-CP-42-0272 (S.C. 7th Cir. C.P. Aug. 22,2006)
4rd v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 336, 642 S.E.2d 590, 599 (2007)
George v. State, No. 99-CP-26-1715 (S.C. 15th Cir. C.P. Jan. 9,2007)
Rosemond v. Catoe, 383 S.C. 320, 330, 680 S.E.2d 5, 11 (2009)
Council v. State, 380 S.C. 159, 181,690 S.E.2d 356, 368 (2009)
Sapp v. State, No. 06-CP-08-2204 (S.C. 9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2009)
Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. 447, 464, 698 S.E.2d 561, 570 (2010)
Rogers v. Ozmint, No. 00-CP-18-575 (S.C. 1st Cir. C.P. Dec. 10, 2010)
Hughey v. State, No. 00-CP-01-0212 (S.C. 8th Cir. C.P. May 14,2010)
Elmore v. State, No. 05-CP-24-1205 (S.C. 8th Cir. C.P. Feb. 1, 2010)
Evans v. State, No. 06-CP-23-7719 (S.C. 13th Cir. C.P. Aug. 29,2011)
Mercer v. State, No. 09-CP-32-5465 (S.C. llth Cir. C.P. June 27, 2011)
Franklin v. Moore, No. 96-CP-45-117 (S.C. 3d Cir. C.P. Jan. 26,2011)
Jinney v. State, No. 2006-CP-11-223 (S.C. 7th Cir. C.P. May 11, 2012)
Weikv. State, 409 S.C. 214, 239, 761 S.E.2d 757, 770(2014)
Evins v. State, No. 07-CP-42-2849 (S.C. 7th Cir. C.P. June 27, 2014)
William Hicks (reversing conviction pursuant to Brady)'
Ted Powers (vacating sentence pursuant to Roper)'
Herman Hughes (vacating sentence pursuant to Roper)'
Robert Conyers (vacating sentence pursuant to Roper )2
Tonmy Lee Davis (vacating sentence pursuant to Atkins)2
* The information in Appendix G was obtained from Justice 360, which
has systematically maintained a list of all post-conviction capital cases
considered in the South Carolina courts. It was confirmed by the authors'
independent legalresearch.
I This reversed the sentence of two defendants.
'Orders granting relief were not available. The reason for reversal was confirmed
with attorneys who formerly represented the individual clients in post-conviction
proceedings.
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APPENDIX H*
Pretrial Death Penalty Case Outcomes 2008-2015
Year of
Defendant County Outcome Disposition
43 Kelly, Theodore Spartanburg Pleato life' 2012
44 Lynch, Kenneth Lexington LWOP 2  2012
45 McClure, David Barnwell LWOP/Plea' 2012
46 Nance, Robert Florence LWOP4  2012
47 Nelson, Robert Dillon DP 2012
48 Owens, Shawn Oconee LWOP/Plea 2012
49 Stewart, Thomas J. Chesterfield DP Withdrawn 2012
50 Whatley, Julian Richland LWOP/Plea 2012
51 Barker, Montez Florence LWOP/Plea 2013
52 Brown-Kelly, Tyler Berkeley 45 years/Plea 2013
53 Daise, Earnest Stewart Beaufort LWOP 2013
54 Delaine, Fonnelze Travis Florence LWOPPlea 2013
55 Hall, Joshua Anthony Laurens LWOPPlea 2013
56 Haselden, Jeffrey Lexington LWOPPlea' 2013
57 Patrick, Quentin Sumter DP Not 2013
58 Rivera, Raymondeze Anderson LWOP/PIea4  2013
59 Rosemond, Andre Spartanburg DP 2013
60 Vasquez, Angel Horry LWOP1  2013
61 Blackwell, Ricky Lee Spartanburg Death 2014
62 Cottrell, Luzenski Allen Horry Death4  2014
63 Carter, Stephon Aiken LWOP/PIea 7  2015
64 Evins, Frederick Spartanburg LWOP/Plea' 2015
65 Huggins, Titus Horry LWOP/Plea' 2015
66 Nickolas Miller Kershaw LWOP/PIea 2015
67 Rogers, Timothy D. Dorchester 50 Years/Plea' 2015
68 Philips, Jacob Charleston LWOP/PIea 2015
69 Smith, Cass Franklin Cherokee LWOP/PIea 2015
* The information in Appendix H was obtained from the South
Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense Capital Trial Division,
which has systematically maintained a list of all potential capital trials
since the Division's creation in 2008. Cases in bold indicate the Capital
Trial Division was appointed to represent the defendant.
Resentencing
Judge sentencing
Prosecutor elected not to seek death in a death eligible
zase considered by the Trial Division to be a likely
zapital case
Retrial
Death penalty withdrawn due to intellectual disability
Found incompentent to stand trial
Plea offered and accepted afterjury selection
